Of Tribal Courts and  Territories  Is Full Faith and Credit Required? by Vetter, William V.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 23 Number 2 Article 4 
1987 
Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Required? 
William V. Vetter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Vetter, William V. (1987) "Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Required?," California 
Western Law Review: Vol. 23 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
Of Tribal Courts and "Territories"
Is Full Faith and Credit Required?
WILLIAM V. VETTER*
In the last fifteen to twenty years, Indian tribal governments
have become increasingly active, expanding both the nature and
amount of their concerns and efforts. The number and variety of
cases being heard in tribal courts are also increasing. A number of
those courts are hearing cases which involve persons who are not
members of the reservation tribe. Unless tribal court judgments
can be enforced outside of the reservation, judgments against non-
members may be useless.
Article IV, section one of the United States Constitution re-
quires that every state give "Full Faith and Credit" to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of other states. Acts of Con-
gress implementing that provision have extended its requirements
and benefits to other governments associated with the United
States. If Indian tribal governments and courts are not entities to
which that full faith and credit provision applies, tribal court
judgments will only be enforceable through application of the
principles of comity, a theory which allows an examination of both
the rendering court and the procedures it employs.
To date, very few state or tribal courts have taken a position
concerning the applicability of the full faith and credit require-
ments to Indian tribal governments or courts. As tribal court ac-
tivity increases and expands into new areas, it is probable that
state courts throughout the nation will eventually need to decide
that issue.
INTRODUCTION
The practice of keeping the prior inhabitants of North America
separate from the immigrating Europeans was well-established
before the American Revolution. Indians were treated, legally, po-
litically and socially, as separate from the white settlers.1 Despite
* J.D., University of Oregon, 1968; LL.M., George Washington University, 1986.
1. That the non-Caucasian peoples who had immigrated to the American continents
thousands of years before 1492 became known as "Indians" because of Christopher Colum-
bus' understandable mistake is well known. While there have been suggestions to change
that identification to "Amerindian" or "Native American" or some similar "less incorrect"
term, "Indian" remains the accepted legal and general appellation and the term used in
federal statutes. Similarly, the term "white" man is used to denote the later immigrants
1
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that separation, the white man's law was applied to Indians
through treaties, the then-contemporary "international law" with
regard to governmental relations with them and the regulation of
white men's activities. Perhaps both less substantial and more in-
fluential was that white men brought with them a set of traditions,
concepts and beliefs containing a view of "reality" which had de-
veloped over centuries and under conditions totally alien to the
New World's inhabitants. Post-fifteenth century discoveries and
experience had a radically modifying impact, but the European
world-view remained the base on which the new American civili-
zation was built.
By the time Chief Justice John Marshall wrote his opinions lay-
ing the foundation of United States law regarding Indians, 2 it was
accepted ideology that Indians and whites could not intermingle in
harmony.3 Indians were viewed as having, and comprising, politi-
cal "nations" separate from whites, but subject to the mandates of
"natural," that is European, legal principles.
Through the more than one hundred fifty years since Marshall's
pronouncements, United States Indian law" has changed in a
number of ways. However, the premise of separate Indian nations
with the power, authority and right to make and be ruled by their
own laws has not been abandoned. 5 The past quarter-century has
witnessed a renewed interest in, and insistence on, Indian tribal
self-determination and self-government. Ironically, one result has
been Indian establishment of European-style governments and
governmental institutions. The informal social controls of commu-
nal tribal living are giving way to formal laws, written by legisla-
tive and executive bodies and enforced by judicial tribunals.'
The model for this development, of course, has been the govern-
mental institutions of the now-dominant "western" society. There-
fore, not surprisingly, an increasing percentage of Indian govern-
ments are asserting powers akin, if not identical, to those
exercised by non-Indian state and local governments, claiming le-
and their descendants despite the fact that that term is often used pejoratively and that
many of that group were and are black or brown. No offense is intended by the author in
the use of any of these terms.
2. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
3. See, e.g., McIntosh, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590-91.
4. "Indian law" has become the generally accepted label for the law of the United
States which has particular application to Indian individuals and tribes. This is primarily a
body of federal law. See F. COHEN. HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (1982 ed.)
[hereinafter COHEN-1982].
5. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959).
6. See, e.g., NAVAJO TRIB. CODE.
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gal control over all persons and events within the geographic
boundaries established for them by the predominant polity. One
aspect of that assertion is the exercise of, or the attempt to exer-
cise, civil judicial power over non-Indians with respect to all acts
and events that occur on the reservation. Such assertions will in-
evitably result in tribal courts' entry of judgments against persons
who are not members of the reservation tribe, including persons
who neither reside nor own property located on the reservation.
Like courts of any other jurisdiction, tribal courts cannot enforce
their judgments per se beyond the geographic boundaries of their
jurisdiction.
One of the significant problems which would be created by a
conclusion that tribal courts do have nonconsensual jurisdiction
over nonmembers is the enforceability of tribal court judgments.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indi-
ans,8 the nonconsenting, nonmember defendant owned personal
property located on the reservation which was attached to satisfy
the default judgment. That will not always be true. For example,
if a nonmember merely driving through a reservation is responsi-
ble for an automobile accident with a member or other nonmem-
ber, if personal jurisdiction is obtained9 and a judgment is entered
by the tribal court, there would be no leviable property on the
reservation.10
7. Whether such exercise exceeds the rationale underlying Indian tribal authority is
beyond the scope of this Article. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978), the Court held that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is incon-
sistent with the tribes' "dependent" status and therefore such jurisdiction can be asserted
only on the express permission of Congress.
A related question, also beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the invocation of
tribal court jurisdiction prevents the exercise of jurisdiction over the same parties and sub-
ject matter by the state or federal courts. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Limpy, 195 Mont.
314, 636 P.2d 266 (1981); County of Vilas v. Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 361 N.W.2d 699(1985).
8. 475 U.S. 845 (1985).
9. It would not be unreasonable to assume that tribal governments would enact long
arm statutes similar to those of the states.
10. It would seem that the Indian Civil Rights Act, particularly title II, § 202 (25
U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982)), would preclude prejudgment attachment to same extent it is
precluded to states by fourteenth amendment due process requirements. Section 202 pro-
vides that "[n]o tribe exercising powers of self-government shall- . . (8) ... deprive any
person of liberty or property without due process of law." See Johnson v. Lower Elwha
Tribal Community of Lower Elwha Indian Reservation, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973)
(hearing required before deprivation of reservation land assignment). But see R.J. Wil-
liams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981) (no federal
court remedy for summary attachment by tribal court without jurisdiction or a meaningful
prejudgment hearing).
If, however, tribal court judgments are not afforded full faith and credit, the special
circumstances surrounding an action against a temporarily present, nonmember defendant
arguably should allow prejudgment seizure of property, a bond posting requirement or
some other measure to assure satisfaction of any judgment which may be later rendered.
3
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If tribal court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in
the same manner as state court judgments, the absence of on-res-
ervation property would pose no greater obstacle than does the
absence of in-state property in the event of a state court judgment.
However, it is doubtful that many courts-state, tribal or fed-
eral-will conclude that they are required to apply the full faith
and credit implementing statute"1 to Indian tribes or tribal court
judgments.
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,1 2 which applies only to the states, authorizes Congress to
adopt implementing legislation. Congress first did so in 179013 but
made references to no governments other than those of the states.
By 1804, when Congress supplemented the 1790 Act, the geo-
graphic and political situation of the new nation had changed
drastically. Non-Indian settlement had spread westward. A num-
ber of new political entities had been created, most labeled "terri-
tories" and intended to become states. The vast expanse of the
Louisiana Purchase had just been added to the political domain.
In response to the changing situation,14 the 1804 implementing
legislation added "territories of the United States and countries
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to the entities
which must give, and whose acts must be given, full faith and
credit. 5
Any such provision should also require that the defendant be reimbursed for any associated
costs in the event he prevails in the action. The result might be the necessity of purchasing
temporary insurance, such as when driving one's own automobile into Mexico, whenever
driving through a reservation.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
12. US. CoNsT. art. IV, § I states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
13. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. That act states:
Be it inacted ... That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be
authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the
records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state, [sic] shall be proved or
admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the
clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certifi-
cate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that
the said attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings
authenticated as aforesaid, [sic] shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of
the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.
14. It was, no doubt, obvious to members of Congress by 1804 that the United States
would continue to expand. Consequently, their enactments were probably intended to be
flexible enough to accommodate that expansion.
15. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298. Section 2 of that act states:
[A]II of the provisions of this act, and the act to which this is a supplement, shall
apply as well to the public acts, records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts
and offices of the respective territories of the United States, and countries subject
[Vol. 23
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Between 1804 and 1948, the political domain of the United
States changed significantly and on a number of occasions includ-
ing the addition of Texas, the cession of the Southwest and Cali-
fornia by Mexico, the negotiation of the northern boundary of the
Oregon Country, the purchase of Alaska and the Virgin Islands
and, for varying lengths of time, the cession of the Philippines,
Cuba and Puerto Rico by Spain. The continental United States
was transformed from sparsely inhabited "Indian country" into
fifty states and a number of associated polities, resulting in the
emergence of a preeminent world power. However, during that
same period, the terminology of the full faith and credit imple-
menting statute did not change.
With what have been called minor changes,"6 the 1804 Act re-
mains in effect today at sections 1738 and 1739 of title 28 of the
United States Code. Section 1738, applicable to court judgments,
states in part:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of any State, Terri-
tory, or Possession of the United States] ... shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken.17
Since they are not otherwise mentioned, section 1738 applies to
Indian tribes only if they are "territories or possessions" of the
United States within the meaning of that statute. State and fed-
eral court decisions concerning that issue are conflicting. A dearth
of legislative history exacerbates the problem. 8
to the jurisdiction of the United States, as to the public acts, records, office books,judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the several states.
16. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
18. With respect to the legislative history of the 1804 Act, see Nadelmann, Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56
MICH. L. REv. 33, 61 (1957).
The amending of the implementing statute was suggested in the House of Representa-
tives in November, 1803. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 554 (1852). The matter came before the
House on a number of occasions (see id. at 555, 625, 979, 1226-27), but only the title of
the legislation was recorded and the debate was limited: On November 11, 1803, "[a]fter
considerable discussion, developing much diversity of opinion ... the bill was recommitted
to a select committee of nine members." Id. at 625. "After some time spent thereon, the
bill was reported [passed] without amendment .... " Id. at 1227. In the Senate, the bill
passed by the House was "read" three times over a four day period at the end of the
session (March 24 through March 27, 1804, inclusive) and passed, apparently without dis-
cussion. Id. at 299-300, 304, 306.
With respect to the legislative history of the 1948 Judicial Code revisions, see
Nadelmann, supra, at 81-82. "Neither [the Chairman on the Committee on Revision] nor
any one else mentioned the changes in the provisions derived from the Acts of Congress in
1790 or 1804. Nor were these changes mentioned in the debates of Congress." Id. at 82.
19871
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The courts have been forced to determine which entities or ar-
eas associated with the United States are included in the 1804 or
1948 Acts' language. Those few decisions which deal with the is-
sue provide very little support for a conclusion that Indian tribes
are included in section 1738. Moreover, the actions of Congress,
testimony before congressional committees and executive depart-
ment pronouncements fail to support such a conclusion.
I. "TERRITORY" IN THE COURTS
A. Indian Tribes as "Terroritories"
1. Federal Decisions
An 1856 Supreme Court decision 9 and a series of decisions by
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1890's"° have been
interpreted as deciding that, at least at that time, decisions of the
courts of the "Five Civilized Tribes"21 were binding on federal
courts. In contrast, the majority of the more recent state court
decisions have not found that they are required to give full faith
and credit to Indian tribal court judgments.2 2 With few excep-
tions, the decisions which find in favor of full faith and credit ei-
ther are specifically required to do so by federal statute23 or con-
cern tribal court decisions on matters traditionally within
exclusive tribal jurisdiction.24
Modern cases provide only superficial support for the conclusion
that full faith and credit must be accorded to tribal court judg-
ments. The only contemporary Supreme Court mention of the
subject is in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,25 which is typical of
the manner in which this issue has been handled by the courts. At
the end of a footnote supplying data concerning the number of
tribal courts and the cases they heard in 1973, the Court gratui-
tously added:
Judgments of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their
19. United States ex reL Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
20. Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897); Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F.
305 (8th Cir. 1894); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894); Exendine v. Pore, 56
F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893); Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893).
21. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and Seminole tribes were often col-
lectively labeled the "Five Civilized Tribes" or "Nations" even in federal legislation, possi-
bly to distinguish them from other tribes, such as the Sioux, Navajo, Apache and others
which were still, at that time, actively engaged in preserving their traditional way of life.
22. See infra Part I. A. 2.
23. See, e.g., the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1982).
24. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7-8, 655 P.2d 895, 901-02 (1982)
(adoption of Indian child; tribal adoption order before Indian Child Welfare Act adopted,
state court decision after); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
25. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
[Vol. 23
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jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances as enti-
tled to full faith and credit in other courts. See, e.g., United
States ex reL Mackey v. Coxe, [59 U.S.] 18 How. 100 (1856);
Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (CA8 1894), appeal dis-
missed, 17 S. Ct. 999, 41 L. Ed. 1177 (1896).2"
The mention of full faith and credit in the Martinez footnote is
obviously dicta.
All of the cases, including Martinez, stating that Indian tribes
or their courts are entitled to full faith and credit rely, directly or
indirectly-and without critical examination-on United States
ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe.27 The Supreme Court's statements con-
cerning full faith and credit in Mackey both are dicta and do not
relate to, nor consider, the full faith and credit clause of the Con-
stitution or its implementing statutes.
Mackey originated in the District of Columbia court as a pro-
ceeding to collect on a performance bond which had been posted
to allow the commencement of an ancillary probate proceeding in
that court. The plaintiffs were heirs of a Cherokee citizen and had
been appointed administrators of the estate by the Cherokee Tri-
bal Court. The ancillary proceeding had been commenced by a
Mr. Raines, the attorney-in-fact for the heirs. The Court's discus-
sion of the faith and credit to be given to the Cherokee court ap-
pointment related to an 1812 act2" which authorized an executor
qualified in any "state or territory" to bring certain actions in the
District of Columbia courts without first qualifying as executor,
that is, without commencing an ancillary probate.29 Despite the
Court's statements concerning the lack of any necessity therefor,
Raines had commenced ancillary proceedings in the District of
Columbia because the United States Treasury Department had
refused to pay him money owed to the decedent until he had done
so.30 Raines had eventually received the money as ancillary ad-
ministrator and transferred it to himself as attorney-in-fact for the
26. Id. at 66 n.21. Neither the footnote as a whole, nor the part quoted, have any
significant relationship to the issue in the case: whether a federal cause of action other than
habeas corpus is available to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(1982). If tribal courts were, by statute, entitled to full faith and credit, the "in some
circumstances" language in Martinez would be inappropriate.
27. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
28. Act of June 24, 1812, ch. 106, § 11, 2 Stat. 755.
29. Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 102-03.
30. Id. at 101. The Court stated:
Under this law [section II of the 1812 Act] the money due to Mackey might have
been paid, and, indeed, should have been paid, to Raines, the attorney in fact of
the administrators of Mackey. But, through abundant caution, letters of adminis-
tration were required to be taken out in this District, as a prerequisite to the
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heirs. If those ancillary proceedings had not been commenced,
there would have been no performance bond and the matter actu-
ally before the Court could never have been brought.
The actual dispositon of the case, to which the discussion of full
faith and credit to be given tribal courts was irrelevant, was:
Under the circumstances, it would be a hardship fraught with
injustice, to hold the defendant liable as surety on the adminis-
tration bond. Raines was the confidential agent of the adminis-
trators of Mackey-the money was placed in his hands, under
full authority to receive it. It has never been paid over, it is said,
by reason of the bursting of a boiler, by which Raines lost his
life and the money which he had received. But whether this be
true or not, the money went into the hands of Raines, who was
the agent of the administrators, duly authorized to receive it;
and we think, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
defendant [surety] was thereby discharged. . . . The parties are
estopped from denying the agency of Raines.3'
Even if the full faith and credit discussion in Mackey were not
dicta, it would not support a conclusion that tribal court judg-
ments are entitled to- recognition under section 1738. The statute
to which the Court made reference was the eleventh of sixteen
sections of an act dealing with the authority and procedures of the
courts of the District of Columbia.2 That section had the limited
purpose of allowing an executor, qualified in a decedent's domi-
cile, to bring an action in the District of Columbia courts without
the expense and trouble of commencing ancillary proceedings.33
The very limited effect of that section, and the very localized na-
ture of and purpose for the entire act, are substantially different
from, and much less significant than, any act implementing the
Constitution's full faith and credit clause. The District of Colum-
bia court was the only government office or agency which was af-
fected by the act. The statute had no effect whatsoever on the
actions or proceedings of any court or other agency of any state,
territory or other jurisdiction.
31. Id. at 104-05.
32. Act of June 24, 1812, ch. 106, 2 Stat. 755-59. That act coordinated the laws
applicable in the "County of Alexandria" (previously ceded by Virginia) and the "County
of Washington" (previously ceded by Maryland). Under the provisions of the act accepting
the cessions from the two states (Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103), the laws in the
two "counties" were previously those of the ceding state. The Act is properly characterized
as "state" or "local" law for Washington, D.C., rather than federal law of general applica-
tion. For example, § nine made it possible for a resident of Alexandria to move his slaves to
Washington without surrendering any property rights. Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 44, 49
(1834).
33. Since, by treaty, the Cherokee Nation had exclusive jurisdiction over tribal and
tribal members' property matters, no other court, whether state or territorial, had original
probate jurisdiction and therefore no other probate proceedings could have been brought.
See Treaty of March 14, 1835, art. 5 (quoted in Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 102).
[Vol. 23
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In Standley v. Roberts,3 4 the other case cited in the Martinez
footnote, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed whether
the federal district court should have enjoined the execution of a
Choctaw tribal court judgment involving the same parties and
subject matter as before the district court. All parties to the tribal
court action were citizens of the Choctaw nation. A then recent
federal statute3 5 provided that the Choctaw courts had exclusivejurisdiction over matters between its citizens and arising within
the reservation.3 6 The substance of Standley was that no cause of
action had been alleged against the relevant parties and therefore
the federal district court should have dismissed the action without
regard to the Choctaw action or the status of Choctaw courts.37
Therefore, it was pure dicta when the Eighth Circuit stated:
"[T]his court has held that judgments of the courts of these na-
tions, in cases within their jurisdiction, stand on the same footing
with those of the courts of the territories of the Union and are
entitled to the same faith and credit. 3 8
Mehlin v. Ice, 9 the case relied on in the Standley dicta and in
subsequent similar decisions, was an ejectment action initiated in
the United States District Court for the Indian Territory by Ice
against Mehlin and others (all defendants were members of the
Cherokee Nation) to recover possession of a one hundred thirty
acre parcel of land within the boundaries of the Cherokee Reser-
vation. Mehlin had come into possession of the parcel through a
preceding, similar action he had brought in a Cherokee district
court. Ice had been given adequate notice of the tribal court ac-
tion and had made a general appearance; a two day hearing was
then held during which Ice defended on the merits.40 The tribal
court entered a judgment and issued a writ of ejectment in Meh-
lin's favor.4 1 That writ was executed by a Cherokee Nation dis-
trict sheriff, assisted by Mehlin and the other defendants in the
federal court action. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that by generally appearing and actively defending, Ice had
34. 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 999.
35. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81 (quoted in part in Standley, 59 F. at
845).
36. Standley, 59 F. at 845.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Meblin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893)). Two other Eighth Circuit
cases decided by the same three judges also rely on Mehlin: Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305(8th Cir. 1894); Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893). Neither of those cases dis-
cussed the basis for their statements further than citing Mehlin. See also Raymond v.
Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
39. 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893).
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Id. Ice brought the action in federal court fifteen months after the tribal court
issued its writ of ejectment.
1987]
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waived any objection to tribal court jurisdiction over his person"
and that the tribal court unquestionably had subject matter juris-
diction pursuant to a treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the
United States.4a The court's quotation from Mackey,44 and its dis-
cussion of full faith and credit45 in general, was unnecessary to the
decision.4'Modern Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have
not followed the Mehlin line of cases. Decided in 1977, Conroy v.
Frizzel47 was a racial and sexual discrimination action brought
under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3). In its decision, the district court
42. Id. at 19-20.
43. Id. at 17 (citing Treaty of July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799). That treaty had reestab-
lished the relationship between the United States and the Cherokee Nation following the
latter's joining with the Confederate States during the Civil War. One result of that treaty
was that the lands placed under tribal control were reduced by about one half.
44. The court's actual consideration of Mackey was superficial. It stated that in
Mackey, "it became necessary to determine the validity of these letters [of administration
issued by the Cherokee court], and the faith and credit due to them." Mehlin, 56 F. at 18.
The court then proceeded with a long quote from Mackey which included the sentence:
"'No question could arise as to the validity of the Cherokee law under which letters of
administration were granted .... Id. at 19 (quoting Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at
104).
The court apparently did not notice the contradiction between its own statements and
those quoted. The Mehlin decision did not discuss the differences between the 1812 Act
involved in Mackey and general full faith and credit considerations. Nor did Mehlin con-
sider the fact that the Mackey discussion was limited to the status of the Cherokee Nation
for the narrow, local purposes of the 1812 Act.
45. The court stated in Mehlin: "The proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Cherokee Nation in cases within their jurisdiction are on the same footing with proceedings
and judgments of the courts of the territories of the Union, and are entitled to the same
faith and credit." Mehlin, 56 F. at 19. The circuit court did not say that (1) Indian tribes
were "territories" for the purpose of the full faith and credit implementing statute; or (2)
that conclusion was required by any provision of United States constitutional or statutory
law.
46. The "faith and credit" discussion arguably was necessary for application of the
doctrine of resjudicata to the tribal court decision. However, as expressly noted in Mehlin,
a series of treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Nation conferred on the
Cherokee judicial tribunals "'exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising
within their country'" to which only tribal members are parties. Id. at 17 (quoting Treaty
of July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799) (emphasis added). The United States was bound by
that treaty, not by the full faith and credit statute, to recognize judgments of the Cherokee
courts.
Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893), decided three weeks after Mehlin,
presented an identical factual and procedural situation, only the names and the dates were
changed, and was perfunctorily disposed of by a citation to Mehlin. Id. at 778.
Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894), was the last of the line of cases (Mehlin,
Exendine, Standley and Cornells) decided by the same panel of judges, Circuit Judges
Caldwell and Sanborn and District Judge Thayer. All of the opinions except Standley,
which was written by Judge Sanborn, were written by Judge Caldwell. Two of those three
judges participated in Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
In two other cases sometimes cited as being a continuation of that series, Buster v.
Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906), and Hayes v.
Barringer, 168 F. 221 (8th Cir. 1908), the offhand mention of full faith and credit and
citation to Mehlin were equally irrelevant to the issues before the court.
47. 429 F. Supp. 918 (D.S.D. 1977), affid sub nom. Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175
(8th Cir. 1978).
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quoted from the 1897 Raymond v. Raymond decision,4 including
its statement concerning the faith and credit accorded to tribal
divorce decrees.49 However, the issue in Conroy was whether the
Oglala Tribal Court had the authority, in a divorce action be-
tween tribal members, to order a transfer of an interest in trust
lands from one member to another.50 Whether such an order is
required to be given faith and credit was not an issue. In affirming
the district court's judgment, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
was very careful to limit the scope of its decision, stating:
We do not here paint with a broad brush. The question of prop-
erty settlement, if any, upon divorce granted in Tribal Court, is
one of first impression and no authority thereon is cited to us,
pro or con. We rule narrowly upon the property division made,
having in mind the various interests to be considered....
The result sought by the defendant is grossly at variance with
the modern aim, so far as feasible within constitutional and stat-
utory limitations, of giving the Indians "[']the control of their
own affairs and of their own property.[']"51
In Conroy, the court properly said nothing about the faith and
credit to be given to the tribal decree.52
2. State Decisions
The more recent state court decisions which hold that Indian
tribes are "territories" within section 1738 continue the uncritical
reliance on Mackey and Mehlin, sometimes adding a superficial
analogy to Puerto Rico. The most cited recent case is Jim v. CIT
Financial Services Corp.,53 an action in the New Mexico courts
attempting to collect a penalty imposed by Navajo statute for fail-
ure to comply with Navajo-prescribed repossession procedures. In
a terse opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the ap-
48. 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
49. The district court stated: "[A]n Indian tribe 'may maintain its own judicial
tribunals, and their judgments and decrees upon the rights of the persons and property of
members of the [tribe] as against each other are entitled to all the faith and credit ac-
corded to the judgments of territorial courts.'"
Conroy, 429 F. Supp. at 927 (quoting Raymond, 83 F. at 722).
50. Conroy, 429 F. Supp. at 924-28.
51. Id. at 183 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973)(quoting Sen. Wheeler speaking of the Indian Reorganization Act, 78 CONG. REc. 11,125
(1934))) (footnotes omitted).
52. Again in 1981, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not take the opportunity
to resurrect the Mehlin line of cases. In a footnote in Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 526
n.9 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981), the court stated: "While it is clear
that tribal reservation sovereignty is not congruent with state sovereignty, such sovereignty
as the tribes do possess is entitled to recognition and respect by both state and federal
governments."
53. 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975), rev'g 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App.
1974) (Herandez, J., dissenting).
1987]
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pellate court's divided opinion, expressly agreed with that part of
Appellate Court Judge Hernandez' dissent concerning the status
of the Navajo Tribe as a "territory" under section 1738, 51 but dis-
agreed with Judge Hernandez' result.5 5 Judge Hernandez' opinion
rests on three points: (1) a long quotation of the dicta in Mackey
comparing the Cherokee Nation to "other territories of the
Union"; (2) citing Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus,56
the legal conclusion that the term "territories" does not have a
fixed and technical meaning; and (3) citing no similar decision as
authority, the assertion that "the status and legal character of the
Navajo Tribe is analogous to that of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico."'57 While the second of those propositions is almost unani-
mously conceded, the first and third do not provide adequate sup-
port for the result reached. 58
Other state court decisions granting full faith and credit to In-
dian tribes rely solely on Jim, on the cases relied on in Jim or on
some combination of Jim and the authorities it cites.5 9 The analy-
sis in those other decisions is, for the most part, superficial or non-
existent. 60 To date, the cases do not provide solid support for the
conclusion that Indian tribes are entitled to full faith and credit
under section 1738 or its predecessors. The majority of the state
court decisions considering the issue conclude that there is no full
faith and credit requirement.
54. 86 N.M. at 789-91, 527 P.2d at 1227-30 (Hernandez, J., dissenting).
55. The ultimate decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court was to remand the
case to the trial court for a determination of whether the parties had made a choice of law
agreement as a part of the conditional sales contract which lay at the bottom of the entire
proceedings but which was not a part of the record on appeal. 87 N.M. at 363, 533 P.2d at
753.
56. 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966). See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus.
57. Jim, 86 N.M, at 789-90, 527 P.2d at 1228.
58. For a discussion of Mackey, see supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. For a
comparison of Puerto Rico and other acknowledged "territories," see infra Part I. C.
59. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895, (1982); Chischilly v.
G.M.A.C., 96 N.M. 264, 629 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 N.M.
113, 628 P.2d 683 (1981); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). But cf.
Queets Band of Indians v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 1, 682 P.2d 909 (1984) (Indian tribes are
not a "state or territory" for purposes of reciprocity under Washington's automobile licens-
ing statute). Compare that case with Red Lake Band of Chippewa v. State, 311 Minn. 241,
248 N.W.2d 722 (1976) (Indian tribe, entitled to reciprocity under Minnesota's automobile
licensing statutes to prevent dilution of governmental power, is not specifically a
"territory").
60. For example, in Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 8 n.2, 655 P.2d 895, 902
n,2 (1982), one significant consideration seems to have been the court's desire to convince
the Shoshone-Bannock Appellate Court to revise its earlier holding concerning § 1738 and
foster a "good working relationship between state and tribal courts." But cf. Fisher v.
Fisher, 104 Idaho 68, 656 P.2d 129 (1982) (state court has jurisdiction, in a divorce action,
to require the tribal-member party to pay the nonmember party the value of community
interest in lands and rights which could be possessed or used only by a tribal member).
(Vol. 23
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The Arizona courts have decided a series of cases relating to
the issue, culminating with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.6 1 In 1950,
Begay v. Miller 2 considered whether the divorce of two tribal
members granted by the Court of Indian Offenses for the Navajo
Indians was valid in Arizona. The court concluded that the Nav-
ajo divorce should be recognized "because of the general rule, call
it by whatever name you will, that a divorce valid by the law
where it is granted is recognized as valid everywhere.""3 The court
also held that (1) the Navajo decree was not entitled to full faith
and credit under the United States Constitution because the Nav-
ajo tribe was not a state; and (2) recognition was also not availa-
ble under comity principles, which apply only between indepen-
dent sovereign nations, because the Navajo tribe was not
recognized as such a nation. 4
The enforceability of Navajo court orders came before the Ari-
zona court again in 1962. In re Estate of Lynch65 considered
whether a will admitted to probate in the Navajo Tribal Court
must be admitted in Arizona courts without inquiry into its execu-
tion. Based on an Arizona statute requiring a will be so admitted
if it had previously been admitted in "another state or country", 66
the court found in favor of admission of the Navajo-probated
will. 07 Lynch has been characterized as a "retreat" and as
"backpedaling" from Begay "toward comity"."" However, the dif-
ference between the two decisions is more apparent than real and
is based on an intervening Supreme Court decision69 establishing
the Navajo tribe as a "separate jurisdiction from Arizona
courts"70 and a state statute (similar to that discussed in the
Mackey dicta) directly related to the issue. 1
61. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977). A petition for review by the Ari-
zona Supreme Court was denied. Id.
62. 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950).
63. Id. at 386, 222 P.2d at 628.
64. Id. So far as it goes, the Begay decision was correct based on prior decisions
concerning the dependent status of Indian tribes, including Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). Begay did not consider whether the Navajo Tribe was a "territory"
under § 1738.
65. 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962).
66. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-343 (now codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
3303 (Supp. 1986)).
67. Lynch, 92 Ariz. at 357, 377 P.2d at 201.
68. See Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M.L. REv. 133, 138-39 (1977).
69. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
70. Lynch, 92 Ariz. at 357, 377 P.2d at 201.
71. The Arizona statute is very similar to, and has the same purpose as, the 1812
statute involved in Mackey. Lynch reached the result Mackey proposed as correct. Such
statutes appear to be fairly common provisions in state probate codes. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-4-204 & 45-4-205 (1978 & Supp. 1986); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 4-204 & 4-
19871
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With that background, Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.7 12 came
before the Arizona Court of Appeals in 1977. Brown was an ac-
tion to recover the civil penalties provided by Navajo Tribal law
for violation of the Navajo Tribal repossession laws, the same pro-
visions that were considered by the New Mexico courts in Jim v.
CIT Financial Services Corp.73 The Arizona Court of Appeals
held that the Navajo Tribe is not a "territory" or "possession" of
the United States within the meaning of section 1738 and there-
fore the courts of Arizona are not required to give full faith and
credit to enactments of the Navajo Tribal Council.7 4 In reaching
that decision, the court considered and rejected the reasoning of
Mackey and Jim. Mackey was distinguished on the basis that it
was not concerned with the predecessor of section 1738, but with
the 1812 statute.7 5 The Arizona court concluded that Jim ignored
the historical development of, and legal concepts associated with,
both territories of the United States and the relationship between
the United States and the Indian tribes. 6
Based on early legislation, including Continental Congress reso-
lutions, the Constitution and early court decisions, the Arizona
court concluded that "the concept 'territory' embraced land be-
longing to the United States which had not yet achieved the status
of independent sovereign states."7 7 In contrast, according to the
court, Indian country did not "belong to" the United States, but
was the "home of the Indians."78
The arguments supporting the Brown decision have weaknesses.
These arguments are articulated in terms of the "ownership" of
the land occupied by the Indians, that is, that since title did not
"belong to" the United States, those lands were not territories.
The court said: "In essence, Indian country did not 'belong to' the
United States and thus by definition could not fall within the U.S.
205 (1974).
72. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977).
73. See discussion of Jim, supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. Jim (New
Mexico) and Brown (Arizona) reached opposing results concerning the status of the Nav-
ajo tribe under § 1738. A part of the Navajo Reservation lies in each state. See also Note,
Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1397 (1985); Comment,
Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit Legis-
lation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 801; Note, Arizona Appellate Deci-
sions-Indian Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit to Indian Nations, 20 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1064 (1978); Ragsdale, supra note 68.
74. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 197, 571 P.2d at 694.
75. Id. at 195-96, 571 P.2d at 692-93. See discussion of Mackey, supra notes 27-33
and accompanying text.
76. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 196, 571 P.2d at 693.
77. id.
78. Id. at 196-97, 571 P.2d at 693. The court placed significant reliance on Ex parte
Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883). See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Ex parte Morgan.
[Vol. 23
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Const. art. IV, § 3, authorizing Congress to deal with territories,
and thus could not be historically so considered. 17  The emphasis
on land ownership, as the court itself admitted, 80 is not a currently
viable distinction, if it ever was. The court even recognized, citing
an 1823 case,8" that Indians had always been considered as having
only the right to occupy and use their lands and did not hold legal
title to them.82
If Brown intended to refer to United States' "ownership" as fee
title interest, its reasoning lacks support. Significant portions of
the early territories, such as Ohio and Indiana, remained occupied
by Indians long after territorial (and even state) governments
were formed. If, on the other hand, Brown used "ownership" in
the sense of governmental exercise of sovereign rights (which is
how a government usually "owns" its territory), it is correct only
if the self-imposed limitation on the United States' exercise of sov-
ereignty over the lands occupied by Indians is construed as merely
an acknowledgement that the United States had no sovereignty
over those lands. Such a construction is at odds with the entire
course of political history following the European advent on the
American scene. The problem with the historical rationale of
Brown is its use of semantics and its mixing of concepts. The
court's discussion of "territory" concentrates on the geographic
meaning of that term, a territory being a fixed geographic area
with specified boundaries, pieces of which can be transferred by
deed. The term, as used in section 1738, is not a term of geogra-
phy, but one of political institutions. It refers to, and acts on, gov-
ernments which have a particular relationship to the Union. The
creation of the government, not the survey of borders, establishes
a section 1738 "territory." If Brown reached the appropriate con-
clusion, its articulation of reasons leaves the decision open to criti-
cism. Although not acknowledged by the Arizona court, most of
the authorities it cited recognize that the political relationship be-
tween the Indian tribes and the United States is not one which
79. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 196, 571 P.2d at 693-94.
80. As acknowledged by the Arizona court, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), held that the Indians' right to land within those claimed by the
United States was, based on European international and United States law, only a right of
use and occupancy. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), held that the
state of Georgia could transfer fee title to lands rightfully occupied by Indians, subject to
that occupation. Therefore, legal fee title, per se, has never been particularly relevant to
the political relationship between Indians and the United States.
81. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
82. Brown, 117 Ariz. at 197, 571 P.2d at 694. The history relied on in Brown does,
however, show that lands occupied by Indians were obtained from them (at least ostensi-
bly) by purchase or conquest and white men were prohibited from settling on those lands
until such "clear" title was acquired.
1987]
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would support a conclusion that the tribes were political
"territories. ' 3
Other state courts have come to essentially the same conclusion,
that is, that Indian tribes are not "territories" and therefore full
faith and credit is not required.8 4 However, applying principles of
comity, state courts have recognized tribal court decisions con-
cerning such matters as divorces between tribal members,85 pro-
bate of members' estates,8 6 custody and adoption of Indian chil-
dren and disposition of deceased members' bodies.87 Thus, while
state courts have not been amenable to finding that they were re-
quired to do so, they have been willing, in a number of cases, to
recognize and enforce tribal court judgments in traditionally tribal
matters.
Overall, court decisions mentioning full faith and credit for In-
dian court judgments, or other tribal actions, do not provide a
solid foundation for concluding that Indian tribes are "territories"
within the meaning of section 1738. Similarly, judicial decisions
concerning the meaning of "territories" in other contexts as well
as statutes do not support such a conclusion.
B. Extradition, "Territory" and Indian Tribes
Apparently, courts have never held that Indian tribes were ter-
ritories of the United States for purposes of federal extradition
statutes. As with full faith and credit, provisions concerning extra-
dition from one state to another are included in article IV of the
83. Id. at 198-99, 571 P.2d 695-96.
Other decisions of Arizona courts have also declined to find that Indian tribal action;
must be granted full faith and credit. Some of those decisions, while declining to state that
tribal court decisions were entitled to recognition under comity principles, gave such an
effect to them. See In re Estate of Lynch, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962); Begay v.
Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950); Leon v. Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 689 P.2d 566
(Ct. App. 1984).
While Brown discussed the possibility of recognizing Navajo tribal laws on the basis of
comity, it concluded that the parties had made a choice of law decision when executing the
subject conditional sales contract to apply Arizona law.
84. Most courts do little more than state that Indian tribes are not territories. Those
that go further generally support that conclusion with some reference to the "independent
sovereignty" of Indian tribes with little or no discussion concerning whether they are "terri-
tories" under § 1738. See, e.g., Red Fox v. Red Fox, 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918
(1975); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985). Cf. Malaterre v. Malaterre,
293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1980).
85. Leon v. Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 689 P.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1984); Red Fox v.
Red Fox, 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975). Cf. In re Marriage of Limpy, 195 Mont.
314, 636 P.2d 266 (1981).
The Oregon decision in Red Fox was reviewed and approved by the federal courts. See
Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1977).
86. Cf. In re Estate of Lynch, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962).
87. Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985).
[Vol. 23
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Constitution."8 Similarly, Congress acted early to implement the
extradition provisions.89 Again similarly, while the Constitution
includes only states, Congress added "territories" to those polities
which are entitled and subject to extradition provisions.9 0
In 1883, the legendary Judge Parker of the Western District
Court of Arkansas was required to decide if the Cherokee Nation
was a "territory" within the meaning of the extradition statute.91
In Ex parte Morgan, he held that Congress had the power, at
least under the authority granted to it over territories, to include
territories in the extradition statute.9 2 He further held that "when
used to designate a political organization, [territory] has a distinc-
tive, fixed, and legal meaning under our political institutions. 93
After reviewing legislation enacted under both the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, he concluded that
[a] territory, under the constitution and laws of the United
States, is an inchoate state,-a portion of the country not in-
cluded within the limits of any state, and not yet admitted as a
state into the Union, but organized under the laws of congress,
with a separate legislature, under a territorial governor and
other officers appointed by the president and senate of the
United States. 4
The judge went on to note that, by treaty, the geographic area
occupied by the Cherokee Nation could not be included within the
jurisdiction of any state or territory of the United States and that
throughout the history of the relationship between the Indians and
the United States, "Indian country" had always been treated dif-
ferently from, and was considered distinct from, "states" or
"territories."9 5
Some of the statements in Morgan can be, and have been, la-
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, provides:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
89. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, I Stat. 302 (codified as 2 Rev. Stat. § 5278 (1874),
Rev. Stat. § 5278 (2d ed. 1878)) (currently codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3182
(1982)).
90. As originally enacted in 1793, the extradition statute included "any state of the
union, or... either of the territories northwest or south of the river Ohio .... Act of Feb.
12, 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302. As codified in 1874, the comparable language was "any
State or Territory .... " 2 Rev. Stat. § 5278 (1874).
91. Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883).
92. Id. at 302-03.
93. Id. at 304.
94. Id. at 305.
95. Id. at 305-07. Morgan was cited with approval in O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933), which also held that territories were transitory, intended to eventu-
ally become states. Id. at 537-38.
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beled as incorrect or no longer valid. Morgan unequivocally took
the position that "territory" can have but one narrow, precise
meaning, that is, an inchoate state. Subsequent cases"6 have con-
cluded that the term is somewhat more flexible.97 Similarly, Mor-
gan included the statement that tribal governments could not be
"territories" because Indians were not citizens of the United
States. That situation is no longer true. Even though that state-
ment could be used as a basis for attempting to distinguish Mor-
gan from any modern situation, it was only an example based on
the underlying legal theory that Indian tribes and Indian peoples
were a separate (albeit dependent) political community recognized
as different from the states or territories of the Union in the Con-
stitution, treaties and legislation enacted throughout the first hun-
dred years of the nation's existence.9 That Indians were not then
United States citizens was only one minor part of their separate-
ness. While that part may have disappeared, the separateness
remains.
Ex parte Morgan seems to have so firmly established the pro-
position that Indian tribal lands were not "territories" for pur-
poses of extradition that the issue has not been subsequently
raised.99 From a much more recent case, it can be concluded, by
implication, that the Morgan rationale remains valid. In Arizona
ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle,100 the Navajo Tribal Court had refused
to order extradition of Wayne Turtle, a Cheyenne Indian residing
on the Navajo Reservation, to Oklahoma because the Navajo or-
dinance only provided for extradition to Arizona, New Mexico
and Utah. After that refusal, Oklahoma requested Arizona state
96. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
97. However, it should be remembered that in 1883, areas such as Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands had not yet come into the United States' polity. The political definition
of "territory" enunciated in Morgan has been approved and applied by the Supreme Court
in deciding that Puerto Rico was different from Indian tribes and was a "territory." See
People ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909). Cf. O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1933).
98. Morgan, 20 F. at 305-07.
99. Part of the explanation may also lie in the fact that (a) most Indian treaties
require that the Indian tribe turn over to United States authorities any white man who
commits a crime on the reservation or any Indian who commits a crime against a white
man (see, e.g., 1846 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation noted in Morgan, 20 F. at 306); and
(b) since the enactment of the Major Crimes Act (Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 385, § 9, 23
Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. III 1985))), most serious
crimes committed on reservations are federal crimes. See also Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, Act of Apr. 1I, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 201(7), 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982)) (limiting tribal courts to maximum sentences of no greater
than six months or a fine of $500, or both).
The argument could also be made that Indians tried for state offenses are less frequently
released on bail or granted probation and therefore the occasion for a state request for
extradition from reservation areas arises less frequently.
100. 413 F.2d 683, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
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officials to extradite Turtle. The Sheriff of Apache County went
onto the Navajo Reservation and took Turtle into state custody.101
On petition for writ of habeas corpus, the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Arizona's actions improperly infringed on the
power of the Navajo Tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by
them. 102 In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court
stated: "We have been referred to no specific Congressional action
limiting the power of the Navajo tribal government to deal with
the extradition of Indians resident within the Reservation or
granting to the State of Arizona the authority to exercise extradi-
tion jurisdiction over such residents."'03 Necessarily implied in
that decision is the conclusion that the Navajo Tribe is not a "ter-
ritory" within the meaning of federal extradition statutes. If it
were such a territory, the tribal law limiting extradition to the
three neighboring states would be invalid.
Given the similarity of the language of, and the reasons for, the
constitutional provisions concerning full faith and credit and those
concerning extradition, together with the similarity of the congres-
sional action implementing those respective provisions, a conclu-
sion that Indian tribes were "territories" for one statute but not
the other would require the sacrifice of substance for some rather
minute splitting of very fine, and very peripherial, hairs.
C. "Territory" in Other Contexts
The meaning of the word "territory" in a statute can and does
vary.10 4 Where the purpose of Congress was to proscribe certain
activity throughout the full geographic scope of its authority (for
example in section three of the Sherman Antitrust Act'05 and sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866106), "territory" has been
construed to include such areas as Puerto Rico,10 7 the District of
101. Turtle, 413 F.2d at 684.
102. Id. at 685-86.
103. Id. at 685. Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1980), held that no federal
law or court decision required that a state lose jurisdiction over a criminal defendant solely
because he was arrested in violation of a tribal extradition ordinance.
104. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) reh'g denied, 410 U.S.
959 (1973); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
105. Act of July 20, 1890, ch. 647, § 3, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3
(1982)).
106. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
107. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (applying § 3 of the
Sherman Act); Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying the
Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act). But cf. Garcia v. Friesecke, 597 F.2d 284 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979) (applying Longshoremen's Act coverage provi-
sion, as amended in 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 902(a)).
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Columbia 0 8 and American Samoa.109 However, when Congress'
purpose was to prohibit or control certain types of governmental
activity (such as in section one of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871110), or to deal with purely governmental activities, entities,
agencies or functions, "territory" has been construed to mean only
those non-state political entities which are constituent parts of the
Union. 1 Thus, a distinction can be made between the use of "ter-
ritory" in a geographic sense and its use in a political sense. 1 2
In those instances in which it was Congress' intention to pro-
scribe private actions, for example in situations involving restraint
of trade or racial discrimination, the term "territories" has been
interpreted geographically to give the statute the broadest possible
coverage based on the assumption that Congress intended to exer-
cise all of the power it had. 1 In those instances in which it was
Congress' intention to affect local governmental actions, for exam-
ple with regard to failure to enforce civil rights laws, "territories"
has been interpreted politically to include those political units or-
ganized by Congress. Determining whether Congress intended
to exercise its authority over individuals throughout the geo-
graphic area of the United States or only with respect to other
governments within the federal system is not always simple.
One factor in making that determination is the constitutional
provision authorizing the legislation in which the term is used. In
District of Columbia v. Carter,1 5 the Court distinguished be-
tween the meaning of "territory" as used in 42 U.S.C. section
1982, which prohibits racial discrimination, and the meaning of
"territory" as used in 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which authorizes a
108. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (applying § I of the Civil Rights Act of
1866).
109. United States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 404 U.S. 558 (1972), reh'g denied, 405
U.S. 969 (1972) (applying § 3 of the Sherman Act); Tien Lop Lee v. United States, 549
F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1977) (employee of American Samoa government equivalent to an em-
ployee of the federal government for the purposes of Naturalization Act preferences).
110. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
Ill. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (construing Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982))). Cf. In re Lane, 135 U.S. 443 (1890) (holding that the exception of "the territo-
ries" in a federal carnal knowledge act (Act of Feb. 9, 1889, ch. 120, 25 Stat. 658) did not
include the Oklahoma Territory because it was not a territory organized pursuant to an
organic act).
112. This should be contrasted with some rather vague "remedial" versus "narrow
cause of action" distinction, such as that suggested in Comment, supra note 73, at 806.
113. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Puerto Rico v.
Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
114. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572 (1976); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
115. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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federal cause of action for deprivations of federal rights. The basis
for this distinction was that section 1982 was intended to imple-
ment the thirteenth amendment prohibition of slavery while sec-
tion 1983 was enacted to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment applicable only to states and persons acting under
state authority."1 6
As with the fourteenth amendment, the full faith and credit
clause addresses only official state governmental actions. 117 In the
implementing acts, the term "territories" is employed to describe
(1) governments whose legislative, administrative and judicial acts
are to be accorded faith and credit; and (2) governments which
are required to accord such faith and credit. Based on the politi-
cal/geographic dichotomy, "territories" in section 1738 can only
be construed as identifying political entities, not geographic
locales.
In determining which entities are political territories of the
United States, those which have been traditionally so designated
and for which Congress has established a "territorial govern-
ment," have presented no difficulty.1 Identifying other geo-
graphic areas with organized governments, but which are not la-
beled "territory," has presented greater difficulty.
In most instances, political territories have been "inchoate
states," that is, self-governing political communities destined to
become sovereign states and join, on an equal basis, with the other
states of the Union. 1 9 The power of Congress to create govern-
ments for such geographic areas and prescribe the limits of the
authority of those governments has been long recognized. 120 The
characteristics of political territories of the United States can be
generally described as (1) having local self-government, subject to
the provisions of the legislation authorizing local political organi-
116. Id. at 421-23. "Territory" in the Sherman Act, enacted pursuant to Congress'
authority over interstate commerce, is construed geographically. See, e.g., United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 404 U.S. 558 (1972) (Sherman Act applicable in American
Samoa); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (Sherman Act applicable in
Puerto Rico).
117. See supra note 12 for the text of U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § I.
118. See, e.g., Suesenbach v. Wagner, 41 Minn. 108, 42 N.W. 925 (1889). Simi-
larly, foreign political entities (such as Canada and Mexico) are not included within §
1738.
119. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Granville-Smith
v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933);
Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz.
192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977).
The District of Columbia government has also been distinguished from the territorial
governments on the basis of the statutory autonomy of, and the inability to oversee the day-
to-day operations of, the latter. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 429-32
(1973).
120. See, e.g., Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1955).
1987]
21
Vetter: Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Requi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
zation; (2) being politically and legally subject to the United
States Constitution; (3) not being within the geographic bounda-
ries of any other state or political entity; and (4) intended to even-
tually become a state of the Union. There are, however, polities
which have been held to be "territories" for the purposes of sec-
tion 1738 or other statutes which do not have all of those
characteristics.
The District of Columbia purposefully has a unique status. It is
a federal area, not designated for ultimate statehood, but also not
existing (in contrast to military bases) within the geographic
boundaries of any state. It has, however, been held that the judg-
ments of its courts are to be given the same effect as that given to
state court judgments. In Embry v. Palmer,121 the Court held that
Congress has the power to prescribe the effect of federal court
judgments and that courts of the District of Columbia were fed-
eral courts entitled to the status accorded to federal courts gener-
ally.1 22 In so ruling, the Court relied on the provisions of the Con-
stitution declaring the judicial power of the United States and the
supremacy of the national government.1 23 Based on those provi-
sions, the Court found that federal court judgments "have invaria-
bly been recognized as upon the same footing ... with domestic
judgments of the states, wherever rendered and wherever sought
to be enforced."1 24 However, the Court did not state that the Dis-
trict of Columbia was a "territory" or a "country subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States within the meaning of section
1738's predecessor.
The decisions of the federal courts generally are not among the
types of judgments included within section 1738, but are recog-
nized under the supremacy clause.12 5 In contrast, congressional
power to include territories within the ambit of section 1738 has
been attributed to its authority under article four, section three.
1 26
121. 107 U.S. 3 (1882).
122. Id. at 9-10.
123. Id. (relying on US. CONsT. art. III).
124. Embry, 107 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted). But see Synanon Church v. United
States, 579 F. Supp. 967 (D.D.C. 1984); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Hsu, 478 F. Supp.
1262 (D. Md. 1979) (District of Columbia a "territory" under § 1738, relying on Embry).
The distinction between courts of the District of Columbia and those of territorial gov-
ernments is enunciated in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933), in which the
Court held that the courts of the District of Columbia were created pursuant to article III
and article 1, section 8, clause 17, of the U.S. Constitution while those of the territories
(and territorial governments in general) were established pursuant to article IV, section 3,
clause 2, relating to the power to make rules concerning the territory or property of the
United States.
125. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882); Hall
v. Hall, 238 Md. 191, 208 A.2d 593 (1965).
126. See, e.g., Suesenbach v. Wagner, 41 Minn. 108, 42 N.W. 925 (1889).
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The Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
have, for purposes of section 1738, been held to be "territories" of
the United States127 even though having all of the other character-
istics identified previously, they were not intended, at the time of
the adoption of their respective organic acts, to eventually become
states.
The decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Ameri-
cana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus128 provides perhaps the most
complete analysis of why Puerto Rico is, nevertheless, a "terri-
tory" within section 1738. Americana presented two issues: first,
whether Congress had the power to include the citizens of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico within the group authorized to
bring diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d) which in
turn depended on whether the Commonwealth was a "territory"
within the meaning of article IV, section 3, of the Constitution;
and second, whether a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was entitled to full faith and
credit under section 1738. The court decided both of those issues
in the affirmative. Following an extensive examination of the his-
tory of the relationship between the geographic area of Puerto
Rico and the United States, including the period from the cession
of Puerto Rico by Spain in 1898 to the proclamation of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952, the court concluded that Pu-
erto Rico had previously been recognized as a "territory of the
United States" and the creation of the commonwealth did not
change its essential political relationship to the United States.129
127. Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008, 1013 (3d Cir. 1971) (Virgin Islands); Ameri-
cana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
943 (1967) (Puerto Rico).
See also with respect to Puerto Rico: Torres v. Gardner, 270 F. Supp. I (D.P.R. 1967);
Hilton Int'l Co. v. Arace, 35 Conn. Supp. 522, 394 A.2d 739 (Super. Ct. 1977); Heritage
Corp. of South Florida v. Rivas, 289 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Conquistador
Hotel Corp. v. Fortino, 99 Wis. 2d 16, 298 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1980). See also regard-
ing the Virgin Islands: Chittick v. Chittick, 332 Mass. 554, 126 N.E.2d 495 (1955); Garvin
v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
The converse is also true. See Brau-Guasp v. Rolscreen Co., 299 F. Supp. 459 (D.P.R.
1969) (Iowa judgment entitled to full faith and credit in Puerto Rican courts); Bredin v.
Bredin, 140 F. Supp. 132 (D.V.1. 1956) (Florida divorce action entitled to full faith and
credit in Virgin Islands' courts).
The decisions concerning the full faith and credit to be given to judgments of the courts
of the Virgin Islands generally deal with divorces granted by those courts. The Virgin
Islands divorce statute was invalidated as ultra vires in Granville-Smith v. Granville-
Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
128. 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
129. Americana, 368 F.2d. at 436. The Third Circuit Court noted:
[T]he status of the Island conform[s] to one of the common definitions of a terri-
tory as a "portion of the country not included within the limits of any state, and
not yet admitted as a state into the Union, but organized under the laws of Con-
gress with a separate legislature, under a territorial governor and other officers
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Therefore, the court concluded that Congress retained the author-
ity to include Puerto Rico within 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d).13 0
With respect to the inclusion of Puerto Rico within section
1738, Americana points to slightly different considerations. The
first is that section 1738, in contrast to 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d),
does not expressly include Puerto Rico.131 However, the Third
Circuit Court noted that the Puerto Rican Federal Relations
Act 3 2 specifically provided that all laws of the United States "not
locally inapplicable" have the same force and effect in Puerto
Rico as in the United States.'3 3 The court further noted that
"[t]he defendants admit that there is a government of the United
States in Puerto Rico .. . ."- Based on the further conclusion
that the creation of the commonwealth was not intended to
change its fundamental political, social and economic relationship
with the United States, the court held that Puerto Rico continued
to be a territory of the United States for purposes of section
1738.135 One key to that decision was the conclusion that:
The basic goal of full faith and credit is to coordinate the ad-
ministration of justice throughout the nation. In order to achieve
this goal Congress enacted Section 1738 and by the use of the
words "State, Territory or Possession" Congress intended to
unify all of the courts in our system of government."'
appointed by the President and Senate of the United States."
Id. at 434 (quoting People ex ref. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 475 (1909)). The court
further stated that "'[i]t is important that the nature and general scope of S. 3336 [now
64 Stat. 319] be made absolutely clear. The bill under consideration would not change
Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic relationship to the United
States.'" Americana, 368 F.2d at 435 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2275, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950), reprinted at 1950 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2681-82).
130. Americana, 368 F.2d at 436.
131. Id. at 438.
132. 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1982).
133. Americana, 368 F.2d at 438 (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1982)).
134. Americana, 368 F.2d at 438 (emphasis added). In Talbott v. Silver Bow
County, 139 U.S. 438, 446 (1891), the Court said:
[A territory] is not a distinct sovereignty. It has no independent powers. It is a
political community organized by Congress, all whose powers are created by Con-
gress, and all whose acts are subject to Congressional supervision. Its attitude to
the general government is no more independent than that of a city to the State in
which it is situated, and which has given to it its municipal organization.
As the court had previously explained, "[d]uring the term of their pupilage as Territo-
ries, they are mere dependencies of the United States. Their people do not constitute a
sovereign power. All political authority exercised therein is derived from the General Gov-
ernment." Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 317, 320 (1873). See also National
Bank v. County of Yankton (Dakota Territory), 101 U.S. 129 (1880); Territory v. Daniels,
6 Utah 288, 22 P. 159 (1889).
135. Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39. In Puerto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, 227 U.S.
270, 276-77 (1913), concerning the status of Puerto Rico for sovereign immunity purposes,
the Court equated that government with that of the Territory of Hawaii in significant part
because of the conclusion that both were created by the United States.
136. Americana, 368 F.2d at 438 (emphasis added).
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The status of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
("TTPI") is different from that of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands
and American Samoa. The TTPI has been administered by the
United States as a United Nations' "strategic trust."'13 7 Under the
Trusteeship Agreement, the United States has plenary govern-
mental (legislative, executive and judicial) control over the TTPI.
While there are no cases considering whether the TTPI is a terri-
tory or possession of the United States under section 1738,138
there are a number of decisions considering its status vis-d-vis the
United States, under other statutes. The Fifth and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have considered whether the TTPI government
was an "agency" of the United States government for purposes of
former section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court held that the TTPI was such an agency,139 while the
Ninth Circuit Court held that it was not. 40 More significantly for
current purposes, however, those courts agreed that, for the pur-
poses of I.R.C. section 911, the TTPI was not within the United
States, that is, it was not a territory or possession "of the United
States. ' ' '41 Further, both decisions stressed the conclusion that
sovereignty over the TTPI did not rest with the United States and
that the actions of the United States, despite the broad, all-inclu-
sive grant of authority, remained subject to United Nations'
supervision. 42
137. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, approved
by the U.N. Security Council Apr. 2, 1947, entered into force July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301,
T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement].
138. Under the Secretarial Orders establishing the TTPI government, the decisions
of the local TTPI courts were ultimately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and therefore would appear to have had, for full faith and credit purposes, a status similar
to that of the District of Columbia.
139. Groves v. United States, 533 F.2d 1376, 1386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1000 (1976).
140. McComish v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1978).
141. Groves, 533 F.2d at 1380 (earnings from within the TTPI were "from sources
without the United States"); McComish, 580 F.2d at 1326.
Under I.R.C. § 911 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), income earned in a "foreign country" was
excludable if not paid "by the U.S. government or any U.S. government agency or instru-
mentality". Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(a)(2) (1986). At the time that Groves and McComish
were decided, for § 911 purposes, "foreign country" was defined as "any territory under
the sovereignty of a government other than that of the United States. . . . It ["foreign
country"] does not include a possession or territory of the United States." Treas. Reg. §
1.913-3(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.913-3(d) was repealed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
142. Groves, 533 F.2d at 1384-85; McComish, 580 F.2d at 1328-30. The TTPI gov-
ernment has also been held to be distinct from the United States government for other
purposes. See, e.g., People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975) (TTPI government is not an "agency" of
the U.S. government for the purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act or the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act); Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (TTPI is not an agent of the U.S. for purposes of the
Torts Claims Act).
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On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Court and the District of
Columbia Circuit Court have held that the TTPI government is
"like" a territory or possession of the United States for purposes
of exemption from the federal Administrative Procedures Act143
and the federal Freedom of Information Act.1 " Those conclusions'
were based on a finding that Congress intended to identify, in
those acts, types of agencies or entities rather than naming spe.
cific agencies.14 5 The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
Gale v. Andrus typifies the difficulty in analogizing between vari-
ous categories of intergovernmental relationships:
The similarities of the Trust Territories to the typical territories
and possessions of the United States are self-evident. Appellee
explains that the Trust Territory was established in the same
manner as American Samoa, it has a structure like most territo-
rial governments and has a similar kind of control and supervi-
sion from the United States. For example, Guam is supervised
by the Department of Interior, and Congress may annul its
[Guam's] laws. It would be highly inconsistent to [sic] for this
Court to hold that territories and possessions are exempt [from
the Freedom of Information Act], but the Trust Territory is not,
when the latter is more removed from substantial control by the
United States than most territories and possessions, and is on
the road to self-government.146
D. "Possessions" and Other Polities
Thus far, no court has construed the phrase "country subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" as used in the 1804 full
faith and credit implementing act. Only a handful have dealt with
the term "possession" with respect to full faith and credit or oth-
erwise. Dare v. Secretary of the Air Force47 reviews a majority of
There has been some debate concerning the locus of the sovereignty of areas subject to
U.N. trusteeship. With respect to the TTPI, it is generally agreed that sovereignty does not
lie with the United States. See generally Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United
Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 263 (1948).
143. See Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1980); People of Saipan v.
Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
144. Gale, 643 F.2d at 833.
145. Id. at 832.
146. Id. at 833. Both the Freedom of Information Act and the Administrative Proce-
dures Act were designed to impose obligations on agencies of the federal government. In
both of these instances, the statute in question exempted territories and possessions of the
United States from compliance with their requirements. The exemption of governments of
territories and possessions recognizes that those are, in essence, local governments distinct
from, and to a large extent practically independent from, the federal government. Thus,
because the TTPI government is even more independent than territorial governments, the
courts determined that its government should also be exempt and that the only way to
achieve this result was by including it within the category of "territories and possessions."
147. 608 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Del. 1985), affd without opinion, 787 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 166 (1986).
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In Dare, the plaintiff requested a writ of mandamus requiring
the defendant to order plaintiff's estranged husband, who was sta-
tioned at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, to comply with
a Delaware court's child custody order. The plaintiff's theory was
that 28 U.S.C. section 1738A (the full faith and credit provision
of the federal Parental Kidnaping Act of 1980148) mandated that
commanders of overseas military bases comply with state custody
orders. 149 Key to that contention was the assertion that Clark Air
Force Base was a "possession" of the United States within the
meaning of section 1738A.
In reviewing the available authorities, the district court found
that "possession," like "territory," was susceptible to different
meanings based on the context and circumstances of its use.150
Dare held that a military installation located on land which be-
longs to a foreign sovereign, and occupied at its pleasure, is not a
"possession" "of the United States." '151
The geographic/political dichotomy appears equally valid in the
"possession" context. In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,152 the
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that a military
base in the Crown Colony of Bermuda1 53 was a "possession" of
the United States for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.15 4 The majority opinion in Vermilya-Brown relied primarily
on the terms of the lease which granted the United States author-
ity with respect to the leased area, including the right to control
the maximum hours and minimum wages for those employed
there.155 The Court said that, like "territory," "possession" is sub-ject to differing meanings, depending on the context and pur-
148. See discussion infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
149. Dare, 608 F. Supp. at 1079.
150. Id. at 1079-80 (citing Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253, 258
(1937) (concerning "territory"); Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (concerning
"income"); and Americana of Puerto Rico v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967) (concerning "territory")). See discussion of Americana
and similar cases supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
The Virgin Islands progressed from an "insular possession" (Organic Act of the Virgin
Islands of 1936, 49 Stat. 1807) to an "unincorporated territory" (Organic Act Revision of
the Virgin Islands of 1956, 68 Stat. 497 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1541-1645 (1982 & Supp.
111 1985))).
151. Dare, 608 F. Supp. at 1080.
152. 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 928
(1949).
153. The base was occupied by the United States under a ninety-nine year lease
from Great Britain, similar to the ninety-nine year leases on bases in the Philippines. Ver-
milya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 384 n.7.
154. Id. at 390 (citing Fair Labor Standards Act, §§ 3(b) & (c), 52 Stat. 1060
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1982 & Supp. III 1985))).
155. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 382-83 & n.4.
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pose. 5M The Court held that
[w]hen one reads the comprehensive definition of the reach of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is difficult to formalize a
boundary to its coverage short of areas over which the power of
Congress extends, by our sovereignty or by voluntary grant of
the authority by the sovereign lessor to legislate upon maximum
hours and minimum wages . 57
The dissent1 58 pointed out that the majority's decisions could
cause a multitude of problems with respect to numerous statutes.
The dissent conceded that Congress may have had the power to
regulate wages and hours within the leased area, but to reach that
result through a finding that the area was a "possession" of the
United States was not necessary, was contrary to the course of
negotiation of the lease and could result in international political
problems.1 59 Of particular interest to the present discussion, the
dissent pointed out that all of the areas cited as analogous by the
majority (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands, etc.) were distin-
guishable from the base in Bermuda in one significant respect:
Those other areas "belong to us or they belong to no one. They
are ceded territory over which the United States sovereignty is as
complete and as unquestioned as over the District of Columbia
and they are subject to no dual control or divided allegiance."'' 60
Even if Vermilya-Brown is good law, it is clear that in using
"possession" in the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress was
speaking in a geographic, rather than a political, sense. Given the
purposes and circumstances of that act, Congress was clearly not
intending to affect only the acts of the governments within the
United States.1 6'
Other cases dealing with "possession" are concerned primarily
with distinguishing that term from "dependency. 16 2 While those
decisions shed little direct light on the question, they all at least
156. Id. at 386 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937)).
157. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 389. The Court had noted at the outset that "the
leased area is under the sovereignty of Great Britain and that it is not a territory of the
United States in a political sense, that is, a part of its national domain." Id. at 380-81
(emphasis added).
158. 335 U.S. at 390-409 (Jackson, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Frankfurter and Burton).
159. Id. at 408.
160. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
161. In a somewhat related situation, the Navajo Indian tribe has been held to be
within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. See Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288
F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
162. See, e.g., Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 502 (1936), where the
Court stated: "[T]he Philippine Islands constituted a dependency, for they were not posses-
sions merely, but possessions held by right of cession from Spain and over which the United
States undoubtedly had supreme power of legislation and government." See also United
States v. The Nancy, 27 F. Cas. 69 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 15,854).
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imply that the possessing nation has sovereignty, albeit possibly
temporary, over the geographic area of the "possession. '"163
As with "territory," the terms "country subject to the jurisdic-
tion" and "possession" "of the United States" when used in the
political sense denote political entities created under the sover-
eignty of the United States not subject to dual control or divided
allegiance. Thus, the resolution of whether Indian tribes fall
within those terms in the full faith and credit implementing stat-
utes, as with whether they are "territories," depends on the resolu-
tion of the nature of Indian tribal "sovereignty."
E. A Synthesis- "Terroritories" As A Political or Geographic
Term or as Both
The decisions concluding that tribal court judgments are enti-
tled to full faith and credit, particularly those of the nineteenth
century, mesh with current theories of Indian law if they are con-
sidered in terms of jurisdiction rather than full faith and credit.
With rare exception, the parties to the related tribal court actions
were members of the adjudicating tribe, the action arose within
the tribe's geographic boundaries and the subject matter was tri-
bal membership or rights to tribal property or benefits, or both. In
those exceptions where one of the parties was not a tribal member,
that nonmember had expressly or impliedly consented to tribal
court jurisdiction.
Excluding Jim and the other rare, exceptional cases, all of the
decisions remarking that Indian tribal decisions are given full
faith and credit were cases which modern Indian law would place
within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts. 6 A fundamental
premise of Indian law has been that, unless Congress has ex-
pressly provided otherwise, neither state nor federal courts havejurisdiction over disputes between Indians which arise on a reser-
vation-whether or not there has been a prior tribal court adjudi-
cation of the matter, or even a tribal court capable of adjudicating
the matter. Similarly, as in a proper understanding of Mehlin v.
163. The distinction made is that a "possession" is an area over which the possessor
has practical physical and political control (such as following conquest and before a peace
treaty is effective), while a "dependency" is an area over which the possessor has legiti-
mized its sovereignty to the extent that it is recognized in international circles as being a
political part of the dominant nation. However, those decisions are clearly based on inter-
national law conventions between recognized foreign, independent nation-states which were
not applied to relationships with "uncivilized" native populations.
164. Almost universally, the decisions saying that tribal court judgments should be
given full faith and credit qualify that statement with a phrase such as "as to matters
properly within their jurisdiction." Most of these statements were made long before tribal
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Ice, a party voluntarily appearing and participating in a tribal
court proceeding (or stipulating to tribal court jurisdiction) cannot
later collaterally attack the result of those proceedings on the
grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction.
The distinction is more than semantic. Decisions based on ex-
clusive jurisdiction principles protect tribal self-determination in-
terests in those areas which are most important to the tribes and
their members. If the non-Indian court has no jurisdiction, any
action it may take is void. In contrast, decisions based on full faith
and credit principles assume that the applying court has jurisdic-
tion to, and could, reach a differing result but for the full faith
and credit requirement. Such a decision may be reversable, or pos-
sibly even voidable, but it would not be void ab initio. Merely
erroneous judgments become enforceable if not challenged within
a relatively short period, for example, appealed within thirty days.
In contrast, void judgments can be safely ignored for years--or at
least until the judgment creditor attempts enforcement.
If the rules of stare decisis are kept in mind, a synthesis of
existing court decisions leads to the conclusion that, for purposes
of section 1738, "territories and possessions of the United States"
includes only those entities, regardless of their labels, which are
part of the system of governments established by and under the
Constitution. Such governments are established either in the Con-
stitution or by an act of Congress as authorized by one or more of
the powers granted to it by the Constitution.
That consideration distinguishes Indian tribes from Puerto Rico
and other polities which are territories within the meaning of sec-
tion 1738. Under commonly accepted international law principles,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa and other simi-
larly acquired geographic territories are within and under the ab-
solute sovereignty of the United States. In contrast, under the
principles first enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the
1830's and reiterated in numerous decisions since that time, In-
dian tribes have retained at least some vestiges of their preexisting
independence. In other words, the local governmental powers in
Puerto Rico and other territories are acquired from the United
States, while those powers exercised by Indian tribes have been
retained by them and exist independently of the sovereignty of the
United States.'65
165. The conclusion that Indian tribes are not within the U.S. system of government
is reinforced by decisions holding that the United States Constitution does not constrain
the freedom of Indian tribal governments in matters within their retained powers. See, e.g.,
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In one respect, Indian tribes may be more like the TTPI than
the other "territories and possessions" of the United States. As-
suming, as is the current legal and political notion, that Indian
tribes possess a measure of sovereignty derived from some source
other than the will or largess of the United States, the tribes are
similar to the TTPI whose sovereignty is also derived from sources
other than the United States. Even though the administrative
powers of the United States with respect to both Indian tribes and
the TTPI are, practically speaking, plenary, in both instances, un-
restricted exercise of those powers is theoretically and politically
limited by the nonderivative rights of the governed peoples.
There is, at the same time, a possibly significant distinction.
The TTPI Trusteeship Agreement, as acknowledged by the
United States at the time of its execution, 6' does not convey sov-
ereignty1 67 over the geographic area of the TTPI and provides that
its political status can be altered only with the consent of the
United Nations. 6 8 In contrast, the United States does claim and
has exercised sovereignty and domain over the geographic areas
within the Indian reservations and has legally and unilaterally ter-
minated Indian tribes as political entities.
II. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
Court opinions do not provide adequate support for a conclusion
that section 1738 requires Indian tribal actions be accorded full
faith and credit. Similarly, there is little contextual or contempo-
rary support for the conclusion that Congress, in 1804, 1948 or
currently, was or is of the opinion that the phrase "territories of
the United States" in the full faith and credit implementation
statutes encompasses Indian tribes.
A. Congressional History of Section 1738
Congress' first act implementing the full faith and credit clause,
adopted in 1790, included only state official actions.18 9 Similarly,
in the 1804 supplementary act, the first section dealt only with
"state" records.170 However, section two of the 1804 Act added:
[A]II the provisions of this act, and the act to which this is a
supplement [the 1790 Act], shall apply as well to the public
acts, records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts and of-
fices of the respective territories of the United States, and coun-
166. See 16 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 416 (1947).
167. See Sayre, supra note 142, at 271.
168. See Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 137, §§ 4 & 6.
169. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, I Stat. 122, supra note 13.
170. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, § 1, 2 Stat. 298.
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tries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as to the
public acts, records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts
and offices of the several states.171
Legislative materials relating to the 1804 Act are essentially non-
existent and those which do exist make no mention of the reason
for, or purpose of, the addition of the second section.
When the revised statutes were adopted by the forty-third Con-
gress, the 1790 and 1804 Acts were codified as sections 905 and
906 of chapter seventeen of title XII of the U.S. Code. 1 3 The
code language followed that in section 2 of the 1804 Act, that is,
"any State or Territory, or... any country subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States .. ,, "1"4 That language remained until
the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code.17 5 As a part of that revi-
sion, the 1804 Act's words "of any country subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States" were replaced with "Possession of the
United States."' " The 1948 revisors' intent was to make no "con-
troversial" changes 77 and the revisors' comment on section 1738
was merely "changes were made in phraseology ....
Even though the Supreme Court has stated in at least one In-
dian law case that subsequent legislation may be used to support
interpretations of prior Congresses' intent, 79 it is doubtful that
such consideration could reasonably extend from 1948 back to
1804. Thus, courts and lawyers are left with attempting to deduce
the meaning of "territories" in section 1738 from the 1804 con-
gressional intent based on the surrounding circumstances.
It is obvious that the 1790 Congress was aware of both the geo-
graphic extent of the nation's claimed dominion and the existence
171, Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 299 (emphasis added).
172. See generally 13 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 18. See also Nadelmann, supra
note 18, at 61-62.
173. I Rev. Stat. §§ 905, 906, at 170-71 (1874). See also Rev. Stat. §§ 905, 906, at
171 (2d ed. 1878).
174. 1 Rev. Stat. § 905 (1874). Section 906 contained identical language. The capi-
talization of the word "Territory" but not "country" might be interpreted as intending to
indicate that specific identifiable entities were intended by the former (similar to "States")
but not the latter.
175. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 947.
176. See Historical and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982); Historical and
Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982).
177. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. I of House Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 1600
and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1947) (remarks of William W. Barron, chief
revisor). See also Barron, Judicial Code Revisions of 1948, 8 F.R.D. 439 (1949).
178. Historical and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982); Historical and Revi-
sion Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
A150 (1947). The revisors' notes do not state that the revisions were not significant nor
substantial and it has been convincingly suggested that some of the changes were indeed
significant. See Nadelmann, supra note 18, at 83-86.
179. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 386-87 (1976). See also Moe v. Confed-
erated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472-75 (1976).
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of local governments, authorized by the federal government,
outside the geographic boundaries of the states. In 1787, the Con-
tinental Congress adopted an ordinance providing for the govern-
ance of the geographic area west of the Appalachian Mountains,
east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio River, which
became known as the "Northwest Ordinance of 1787."18° One of
the first enactments of Congress under the then-new Constitution
reaffirmed the Northwest Ordinance.181 Those acts established the
means of exercising non-Indian political authority throughout the
designated geographic area.182
On the same day as the 1790 full faith and credit implementing
act was passed, an act was approved which established a "tempo-
rary government" for the "territory of the United States south of
the river Ohio" which granted the same powers, duties, officials
and privileges of local government as had been granted to the gov-
ernment of the "territory northwest of the Ohio River. 183
By 1804, the area included within the United States, and the
parts for which territorial governments had been established, had
increased dramatically. Under those altered conditions, the 1804
Congress added two jurisdictional categories to those whose offi-
cial actions were to be recognized, that is, "the respective territo-
ries of the United States" and "countries subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States."' Part of the 1804 language
identifying the territories ("respective territories") semantically
tracks part of the 1790 language identifying the states ("respec-
tive states"). The 1804 terminology assumes the existence of more
than one territory of the United States. If the intent were to use
the term "territories" in a merely geographic sense to identify the
area not within a state, the word "respective" would be superflu-
ous. Additionally, the 1804 Act necessarily refers to governments,
not geography, again almost mandating the conclusion that "terri-
tories" was intended to identify the territorial governments estab-
lished by Congress.
That "territories" in the 1804 Act was not intended to include
Indian tribes is supported by language used by Congress in identi-
180. Ordinance of July 13, 1787, reprinted at 1 Stat. 51-53 n.(a) [hereinafter North-
west Ordinance].
181. An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the river
Ohio, Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
182. Those acts made no mention of, nor attempt to directly deal with, the authority
of the Indian tribes over their members or unceded areas. However, they authorized the
governor to lay out counties and townships only in "the parts of the district in which Indian
titles shall have been extinquished .... Northwest Ordinance, supra note 180, % 8, re-
printed at I Stat. 51 n.(a).
183. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123.
184. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, § 2, 2 Stat. 298, 299.
1987]
33
Vetter: Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Requi
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
fying areas under Indian control. Beginning in 1796,185 Congress
adopted the practice 8 6 of specifying a boundary line between
white and Indian lands and, at least by 1800, began the still-con-
tinuing practice of referring to the Indian lands so delineated as
"Indian country. 187 In those instances when Congress did use the
term "territory" with respect to Indians, it was as "Indian terri-
tory" or "the territory of Indians."188 Thus, at the time of the
adoption of the 1804 Act, Congress' convention was to use "terri-
tory" in conjunction with "the United States" or "Indian,"
thereby distinguishing between them. The 1804 Act uses the for-
mer terminology and can, therefore, be reasonably understood to
not include the distinct category of "territories of the Indian
tribes."
Given those linguistic habits, it would be more reasonable to
conclude that if Congress had intended to include Indian govern-
ments within the ambit of the 1804 Act, it would have been as
"countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" rather
than as "territories." Such an interpretation does not, however,
comport with the generally understood relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes. From the time of the discov-
ery of the Americas through 1804, and for some time thereafter,
Indian tribes were considered separate nations not subject, at least
with respect to their internal governments, to control by the
United States.16 9 If the 1804 Congress had intended to identify
Indian tribes as "countries within the jurisdiction of the United
185. An Act to regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to pre-
serve Peace on the Frontiers, Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469. See also An Act to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1
Stat. 137, 137-38; Act of Apr. 22, 1800, ch. 30, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13,
2 Stat. 139.
186. This was first employed in King George's Proclamation of 1763 following the
resolution of the French and Indian War, reprinted at 3 W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN
INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 2135 (1973).
187. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 22, 1800, ch. 30, 2 Stat. 39-40; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch.
13, §§ 3, 16, 2 Stat. 139, 141, 144. The current statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1982).
188. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 30, 1802, §§ 2, 4, 6, 10, 2 Stat. 139, 141-44.
That practice was continued after 1804. See, e.g., An Act for establishing trading houses
with the Indian tribes, Act of Apr. 21, 1806, ch. 48, 2 Stat. 402, reenacted as amended,
Act of Mar. 2, 1811, ch. 30, 2 Stat. 652; An Act to provide for punishment of crimes and
offenses committed within the Indian boundaries, Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1, 3 Stat.
383; An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace
on the frontiers, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161 § 1, 4 Stat. 729.
189. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 146-47 (1809) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet
Indian Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 301 F. Supp. 85, 87-88 (D. Mont. 1969);
Gover & Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: The Litigation in Federal
Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 497, 530-35
(1985).
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States," it would have been contravening legal and political theory
which had been established for nearly three hundred years. Such
an intent would have been directly opposite to the assumptions
underlying contemporaneous legislation expressly concerning Indi-
ans, both linguistically and by requiring that Indian governments
recognize, and give "faith and credit" to, official acts of state and
territorial governments. There is nothing to suggest that the 1804
Congress thought it had such a degree of power over the internal
affairs of Indian tribes.
While the 1804 Congress did not have the benefit of the 1823
decision in Johnson v. McIntosh,190 that decision clearly expresses
the contemporary political theory of the relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes. The Court said that if a non-
Indian purchased land from an Indian tribe, he gained whatever
title may thereby be transferred under Indian law. If, thereafter,
the same tribe transferred its property (including that previously
transferred to the non-Indian purchaser) to the United States,
whatever Indian law rights may have been obtained or lost were
not enforceable in the United States courts."' 1
As the Court stated, "conquest gives a title which the courts of
the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative
opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of
the claim which has been successfully asserted." '92 If, as a result
of the 1804 Act, the laws of the Indian tribes were required to be
given the same faith and credit by all of the courts of the United
States as they were given by the tribe, McIntosh would have been
required to reach the opposite result.193
A related problem with a conclusion that Indian tribes were in-
cluded in the 1804 Act is the fact that the states and organized
territories were not geographically separate from "Indian coun-
try." In 1804, the states of New York, Kentucky, Tennessee and
Georgia all included significant areas of Indian country. The Ter-
ritory of Ohio was mostly Indian country and all of the Territories
of Indiana and Michigan were within Indian country. 194 If Indian
tribes were governments within the 1804 Act, that act would have
recognized at least two "legitimate" governments "of the United
190. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
191. Id. at 594-95.
192. Id. at 588.
193. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that anyone contended that tribal
acts were entitled to faith and credit under the 1804 Act.
194. See Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 1, 2 Stat. 139, 139-41. See generally C.
WALDMAN & M. BRAUN. ATLAS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN 172-97 (1985);
HARPER'S ATLAS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 22 (Fox ed. 1920) (boundary of "Indian Coun-
try" as of 1800).
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States" within the same geographic area. That, in turn, would
have created the possibility that other states and territories have
would been required to enforce contradictory governmental deci-
sions emanating from the same geographic territory.
The two categories of "territories of" and "countries subject
to" the United States may create an anomaly to today's reader.
However, some illumination may be gained from other 1804 legis-
lation. On the day prior to adopting the 1804 Act, Congress
adopted an act providing for the government of the Louisiana
Purchase. 195 That act divided the "country ceded by France" into
the "territory of Orleans"1 96 and the "district of Louisiana ' 197 and
provided for the organization of the government of both portions.
Thus, at the time of the passage of the 1804 Act, there existed at
least one local government, created by and under the jurisdiction
of the United States, which was not a "territorial" government
but still had the attributes which would make application of full
faith and credit appropriate.
B. Recent Congressional Activities
Recent congressional action dealing with full faith and credit
and Indian tribes, both separately and jointly, indicates that both
Congress and the executive branch currently believe that section
1738 does not include Indian tribes.
1. General Studies
A portion of the two year study by the American Indian Policy
Review Commission considered the application of full faith and
credit to Indian tribal court judgments. Part of the Task Force
Two: Tribal Government report to the Commission 8 addressed
"mutuality" and "reciprocity" between state and tribal courts.19
195. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283. That acquisition had been the subject
of extensive discussion during that session of Congress. See 13 Annals of Cong. passim
(1852).
196. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 1, 2 Stat. at 283 (the described area "shall
constitute a territory of the United States . . ."). Section 7 of that act, 2 Stat. at 285,
extended, inter alla, the 1790 full faith and credit implementing act and the acts regulat-
ing trade with Indians to the territory thereby created.
197. Id. § 12, 2 Stat. at 287. The congressional debate concerning if and how the
United States was empowered to add the Louisiana Purchase to its domain was vigorous
and long. For a discussion of that debate, see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 252-57
(1901).
198. Task Force Two: Tribal Government, Report on Tribal Government, Final Re-
port to the American Indian Policy Review Commission (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter
Task Force Two Report].
199. American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Issues in Mutuality-The Ex-
isting Relationship Between State and Tribal Courts, in Task Force Two Report, supra
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Unfortunately, this portion of that report is perhaps more confus-
ing than enlightening, due partly to its approach.2 °0 Despite its
conclusion that Indian tribes are, or at least should be considered,
"territories" under section 1738, Task Force Two recommended to
the full commission that section 1738 be amended by adding "Tri-
bal" and "Indian Tribe" at various points.2 0' That recommenda-
tion was included in the full commission's Final Report to Con-
gress. 2  That particular proposal has never been acted on by
Congress.
2. Indian Child Welfare Act and Parental Kidnaping Act
One major purpose of the Parental Kidnaping Act of 1980203 is
embodied in its full faith and credit provision which provides, in
part, that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every State shall en-
force ... any child custody determination made ... by a court of
another State. '20 4 For the purposes of that act, "state" is defined
as "a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the
United States." 05 The legislative history of that act does not re-
veal any consideration or testimony concerning whether Indian
tribes or reservations would or should be included within the defi-
nition of "state. ' 20 8 The American Bar Association, at the recom-
note 198, app. X, at 227-68; Indian Tribes and Full Faith and Credit, in Task Force Two
Report, supra note 198, app. XIII, at 285-305.
200. The Issues in Mutuality section of the Task Force Two Report, supra note 198,
was the product of an American Indian Lawyer Training Program, "Indian Law Seminar
and Intern Project," and was prepared by law student interns. The "Forward" to the sec-
tion shows that the project proceeded from a less than objective point of view. Appendix B
to the Issues in Mutuality section appears to be a draft of a significant part of the follow-
ing Indian Tribes and Full Faith and Credit article (appendix XII) for which no author is
given. In addition to other problems with these articles, incomplete citations and typo-
graphical or printing errors frequently make understanding difficult or impossible.
201. Task Force Two Report, supra note 198, at 37. No similar recommendation
was made with respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (full faith and credit for nonjudicial records).
202. 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report 214-15 (Comm.
Print 1977). But see Separate Dissenting Views of Congressman Lloyd Meeds, D-Wash.,
Vice Chairman of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, id. at 458.
203. Pub. L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980).
204. Id. § 8 (a), 94 Stat. at'3569-70 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982)).
205. Id. § 8(b)(8), 94 Stat. at 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8) (1982)).
206. See Parental Kidnaping, 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Child and
Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources on "Exami-
nation of the Problem of 'Child Snatching" ', 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Parental Kid-
naping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human
Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
S. Serial No. 96-54A and 96-54A Addendum (1980); Parental Kidnaping: Hearing on
H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R.
Serial No. 73, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter June 1980 Hrq.]; 126 CONG. REC.
22,803-19, 22,842-43 (1980); Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 1401, 96th Cong., 2d
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mendation of its Family Law Section, adopted a resolution sup-
porting the Parental Kidnaping legislation. 0 7 The statement of
the American Bar Association representative, although noting that
"the three American jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Pu-
erto Rico and the Virgin Islands" had not adopted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, made no mention of Indian tribes
or reservations and no recommendation to amend the definition of
"state" in the then proposed section 1738A.208
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978209 was expressly in-
tended to affect Indian tribes and the recognition given to tribal
interests with respect to Indian children. In contrast to the lan-
guage used in the 1980 Parental Kidnaping Act, the full faith and
credit clause included in the Indian Child Welfare Act adds In-
dian tribes to the language employed in both the general full faith
and credit statute and the Parental Kidnaping Act provision. Sec-
tion 101(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act states:
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of
the United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings
to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other
entity.210
The Indian Child Welfare Act, in part, dealt with the same
subject matter as the Parental Kidnaping Act21 and a juxtaposi-
tion of those acts shows that (1) when Congress clearly wants full
faith and credit to be given to tribal decisions, it adds language to
that found in section 1738;212 and (2) Congress does not consider
Sess. (1980), reprinted at 126 CONG. REc. 27,494 (1980).
"State" as used in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (the language of which is
essentially identical to that of the Parental Kidnaping Act) has been expressly held to not
include Indian tribes. Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(construing MINN. STAT. § 518A.01, subd. 1 (1980) which defines "state" to include "any
state, territory, or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia . . ."). Cf. Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 144 (N.D.
1980).
207. See June 1980 Hrg., supra note 206, at 101-02.
208. Id. at 99-106 (testimony of Dr. Doris Jonas Freed, Esq., Chairperson, Comm.
on Custody, and Council Member, Section of Family Law, on behalf of the American Bar
Association).
209. Pub. L. 95-608 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963(1982)).
210. Id. at tit. I, § 108(d), 92 Stat:at 3071 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1982))
(emphasis added).
211. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) (Improper Removal of Child from Custody)
with 18 U.S.C. § 1230 (1982) (Parental Kidnaping).
212. See also Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. 97-459, tit. II, § 208, 96 Stat.
2519 (1983) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2201-2206 (1982) (requiring only the Secretary of
the Interior to "give full faith and credit to any tribal actions taken pursuant to [25
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the general language of section 1738 or section 1738A as includ-
ing Indian tribes.21
3. Maine Indian Lands Claim Settlement
One section of the legislation proposed in 1980 (the same year
the Parental Kidnaping Act was under consideration) to settle the
Maine Indian land claims controversy was a full faith and credit
provision, section 6(f), stating:
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of
the United States, and every Indian nation and tribe and band
of Indians shall give full faith and credit to the judicial proceed-
ings of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation.
The Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation shall give
full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each other and
to the judicial proceedings of the United States, every State,
every territory or possession of the United States, and every rec-
ognized Indian nation and tribe and band of Indians."4
The United States Department of the Interior objected to that
proposal. In his written statement at the July 1, 1980, hearing
before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Secretary
Andrus stated:
Under section 6(f) adjudications of the Passamaquoddy Tribe
and the Penobscot Nation would be required to be given full
faith and credit by the United States, the States, and all other
Indian tribes. Although some courts have accorded full faith and
credit to tribal judicial proceedings, statutory requirements for
such full faith and credit presently exist only with respect to
child custody proceedings. In addition, since tribal governmental
actions are not reviewable except in habeas corpus proceedings
in Federal court, a tribal court adjudication that violates the In-
U.S.C.] section 2205 . .. ").
213. If § 1738 included Indian tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1982) would have been
unnecessary. If § 1738A included Indian tribes, it would have been appropriate to repeal or
amend § 1911(d) when § 1738A was adopted.
The considerations applicable to the interpretation of § 1738A are identical to the con-
siderations applicable to the interpretation of § 1738. See Dare v. Secretary of Air Force,
608 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Del. 1985), affd without opinion, 787 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines not a U.S. "possession" under § 1738A).
214. S. 2829, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(0, 126 CoNG. REc. 14,674, 14,677 (1980),
reprinted at I Proposed Settlement of Maine Indian Lands Claims: Hearings before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 2829, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1980)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1980 Maine Hrgs (Senate)]. The proposed language could
be read to imply that all Indian tribes, regardless of federal status, would be required to
give full faith and credit to the Maine Indians while the latter were only required to give
full faith and credit to federally recognized tribes.
An identical measure was introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 7919. See
Settlement of Indian Land Claims in the State of Maine: Hearing Before the House
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dian Bill of Rights might be required to be given full faith and
credit. We therefore believe that this provision should be deleted
from the bill.2 15
Within six weeks after the Senate hearing, the Department of the
Interior reported that the state of Maine and the Maine Indian
tribes had proposed the much less encompassing substitute for the
objectionable section and that proposal was included in the De-
partment's proposed substitute bill l.2 1  The agreed substitute pro-
vided: "The Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the
State of Maine shall give full faith and credit to the judicial pro-
ceedings of each other.1 17  That proposal was adopted by
Congress.
218
There does not appear to be any record or situational support
for a conclusion that the 1790 or 1804 Congresses considered In-
dian tribes to be included within the meaning of the term "territo-
ries" as used in the full faith and credit legislation they enacted.
To the contrary, there is every reason to conclude the opposite. 19
215. 1980 Maine Hrgs. (Senate), supra note 214, at 135 (written statement of Cecil
D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior).
During the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Senator Cohen of Maine
and Tim Vollmann, Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior:
Senator Cohen. Under section 6(f) of the [proposed] Federal act, judgments of
the tribal courts in Maine would be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of
the United States and any U.S. State or territory. How does this provision com-
pare with current law?
Mr. Vollmann. Right now there is no statute of the United States that gives
tribal court proceedings full faith and credit in State or federal courts. Some of
those courts have honored judgments of tribal courts, nonetheless.
Senator Cohen. Is that on a basis of comity rather than full faith and credit?
Mr. Vollmann. Scholars view it as a comity issue, though one court has called it
full faith and credit.
Id. at 49.
That position is consistent with the position taken by the Solicitor's Office of the Depart-
ment of the Interior in a 1971 letter to the General Counsel of the Department of Agricul-
ture concerning the inclusion of Indian reservations within the meaning of "territory" in
the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 584 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-691 (1982
& Supp. III 1985)). Applicability of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 on Indian Reserva-
tions, 78 Interior Dec. 18 (1971). Perhaps significantly, that Solicitor's opinion expressly
relies on Ex parte Morgan. See id. at 19.
216. Letter of Aug. 8, 1980, from Secretary of the Interior Andrus to Senator
Melcher, reprinted in 1980 Maine Hrgs. (Senate), supra note 214, at 95-127.
217. 1980 Maine Hrgs. (Senate), supra note 214, at 121. According to Secretary
Andrus, "[t]he parties could agree to this form of comity without the consent of Congress,
but we have no objection to its inclusion in the settlement legislation. There is, of course,
no reason why the Tribes may not establish similar comity with other jurisdictions." Id. at
102. See also Settlement of Indian Land Claims in the State of Maine: Hearing on H.R.
7919 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, supra note 214, at 125-72,
132 (1980). See also S. REP. No. 957, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted at 126
CONG. REc. 25,747 (1980).
218. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-420, § 6(g), 94 Stat.
1785, 1793 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (1982)).
219. Cf. Gover & Laurence, supra note 189, at 530-35 (arguing against the possibil-
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It is a matter of record that the Department of the Interior which,
since its creation has administered Indian affairs, is of the opinion
that section 1738 does not apply to Indian tribes. Recent legisla-
tion, particularly section 101(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
strongly supports the conclusion that Congress agrees with the
Department of the Interior and the majority of the courts which
have addressed the issue.
III. SOME SECONDARY SOURCES
Secondary sources, both "leading authorities" and those of less
universal renown, do not resolve the questions remaining after a
careful review of primary authorities. Perhaps because of the
character of the precolumbian political-juridical Indian society
and the length of time before there was a significant number of
European style Indian courts, the extensive opinion written in
1934 by the Department of the Interior's Solicitor's Office appears
to be the first publication to address the issue. Other than a short
reference in Cohen's Handbook, the subject lay essentially unno-
ticed until the New Mexico and Arizona courts issued their di-
rectly conflicting decisions.
A. The 1934 Solicitor's Opinion
In the frequently cited 1934 Solicitor's Opinion, Powers of In-
dian Tribes,22 0 Interior Department Solicitor Margold stated:
"The decisions of Indian tribal courts, rendered in their jurisdic-
tion and according to the forms of law or custom recognized by
the tribe, are entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the
several States. 221 Cited in support of that statement were the fa-
miliar, and even then old, Eighth Circuit Court Court of Appeals
decisions of Raymond v. Raymond, Standley v. Roberts, and
Mehlin v. Ice.222 In addition, Attorney General's Opinions from
ity that the 1870 Congress intended to include Indian tribes as governments against which
civil rights actions might be brought).
220. 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934). This opinion was drafted by the Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior, with the assistance of John Collier, to "flesh out" the language
of § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act (the "Wheeler-Howard Act"). Section 16 merely
recognized the "powers vested in any Indian tribe ... by existing law" (48 Stat. 984, 987)
as the powers which could be exercised by tribes organized under the Act, rather than the
detailed exposition of powers included in the legislation originally proposed by Collier. See
generally V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 154-70 (1984). Deloria and Lytle characterize the 1934
Opinion as an "administrative revolution." Id. at 160. "Margold's opinion worked steadily
in one direction: buttressing the political powers of the tribe that had not been acknowl-
edged by any organ, agency, or branch of the federal government." Id. at 159.
221. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. at 56.
222. See discussion of these cases supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
1987]
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1888223 and 1855,224 a then recent district court decision 22 5 and
the Supreme Court's 1897 Nofire v. United States226 decision
were cited without discussion.227 In addition to the infirmities of
the Eighth Circuit cases, the other cited sources dealt only with
an Indian tribe's jurisdiction to decide matters of tribal member-
ship, rights to tribal benefits and members' property matters.
They did not discuss either full faith and credit in general or the
meaning of the word "territory" in the implementing statute.
Later in that same opinion, the Solicitor, based on a reading of
the cited 1855 Attorney General's Opinion, stated that Indian
tribes "bear[] a relation to the Government of the United States
similar to that which a territory bears to such Government...
",228 With respect to this statement, three points should be consid-
ered. First, it recognizes a distinction between Indian tribes and
territories of the United States. Second, it espouses a relationship
between the United States and the Indian tribes which is directly
contrary to the Supreme Court's later decision in United States v.
Wheeler.229 Third, if that theory of tribal federal relationship is
the basis for the prior conclusion concerning full faith and credit,
that prior conclusion is not well-founded.230 On the whole, at least
this portion of the 1934 Solicitor's Opinion appears more advoca-
tory than expository.
223. 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 109 (1888).
224. 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174 (1855).
225. Washburn v. Parker, 7 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1934).
226. 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
227. Since this appears to be a thoroughly researched opinion, the fact that United
States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856), is not mentioned at this
point could be construed as an acknowledgment that it was not sufficiently analogous to
support the quoted opinion. This is perhaps, even more remarkable when it is noted that
Mackey was cited in support of the proposition that Indian tribes have the power to govern
the descent and distribution of the property of their members. See Powers of Indian
Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. at 43-44. Of course, this oversight could also imply that the Opin-
ion was not so thorough as it might appear on the surface.
228. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. at 63, (discussing 7 Op. Att'y Gen.
174 (1855)). Again, Mackey was not cited.
229. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Wheeler is, ironically, based on the theory of retained,
inherent tribal powers which the 1934 Opinion so vigorously championed. See id. at 323-
30.
230. Though not expressly stated in the discussion section of the 1934 Opinion, the
full faith and credit portion may have been intended to be limited to tribal court decisions
in matters between tribal members or was based on the assumption that such were the only
types of actions tribal courts would or could decide. The related "summary conclusion"
stated that tribes have the power "[tlo administer justice with respect to all disputes and
offenses of or among the members of the tribe, other than the ten major crimes reserved to
the Federal courts." Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. at 66 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 23
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B. Cohen-1942 and 1982
The "Bible" of Indian law, Felix Cohen's original Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, 231 states:
That an Indian tribe has power to confer upon its own courtsjurisdiction over controversies involving Indians is a proposition
supported by authorities which have already been analyzed.
That "full faith and credit" are due to decisions rendered by
tribal courts in cases properly within their jurisdiction, is a sec-
ond basic principle in the field of civil jurisdiction which is sup-
ported by authorities elsewhere analyzed.2 2
The "authorities elsewhere analyzed" are (1) a discussion which
virtually repeats the 1934 Solicitor's Opinion;233 and (2) a state-
ment, supported by quotations from Mackey and Standley v. Rob-
erts, that "Indian tribes have been treated, for certain purposes as
similar to states, territories, or dependencies of the United
States. 234 Interestingly, as examples of enactments conferring
such jurisdiction, a provision from the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Code
and one from the Department of the Interior's regulations cover-
ing Courts of Indian Offenses are quoted.2 5 Both confer outright
jurisdiction over actions between members of the tribe, but limit
jurisdiction over actions involving nonmembers to those which are
brought before tribal court by stipulation of all parties.
Thus, both Cohen's 1942 conclusions and the 1934 Solicitor's
Opinion concerning full faith and credit are based in significant
part either on a subsequently disapproved position concerning the
relationship between the tribes and the federal government or on
the assumption that tribal court jurisdiction was exercised only
over tribal members or persons voluntarily submitting themselves
to that court's jurisdiction.
Cohen's (and perhaps Solicitor Margold's) conclusion concern-
ing the state-tribal-federal relationship was probably influenced by
the "federal instrumentality" doctrine which was not discredited
until some years later. That doctrine held that, for purposes of
executing the United States' trust and treaty obligations to the
Indians, the tribes were instrumentalities, that is, agents, of the
231. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942 & photo reprint 1972)
[hereinafter COHEN-1942].
232. Id. at 382 (footnotes omitted).
233. Id. at 145.
234. Id. at 275. At the time Cohen was writing, the full faith and credit implement-
ing statute had not been revised and still spoke in terms of "countries subject to the juris-
diction of the United States," not "dependencies". It is apparent that it was Cohen's at
least casual opinion that those two terms were interchangeable. However, such an equiva-
lence supports only the argument that the areas intended to be included within the statute
were those which were part of the United States' political family, however temporarily.
235. Id. at 382.
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federal government. 236 Assuming that tribal courts exercise some
responsibility in the United States (which would not have been an
unreasonable assumption in 1940 when the majority of reservation
courts were the administratively created Courts of Indian Of-
fenses), those courts could be seen as federal instrumentalities and
therefore entitled to respect because of that capacity.
Such an argument, however, proves too much and has been dis-
credited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.23 If tribal
courts are acting on behalf of the federal government, then tribal
juridical power would be an attribute delegated by the federal
government. If Indian juridical authority is delegated, it would be
difficult to conclude that Indian legislative and executive authori-
ties had a different source. Such a conclusion is directly contrary
to the inherent sovereignty theory.
The 1982 revision of Cohen's Handbook2 38 takes a much more
ambiguous position. It first notes that application of section 1738
has resulted in conflicting state court decisions239 and then that
the Supreme Court has construed the term "territory" in "an ear-
lier statute" to include Indian tribes, 240 a conclusion reached by
other federal courts.241 However, one gets the impression that the
authors of the 1982 version prefer the application of comity prin-
ciples over the inclusion of Indian tribes within section 1738.242
236. Id. at 275-77.
237. Application of the federal instrumentality doctrine to Indian tribes was repudi-
ated in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 366 (1949). That repudiation
was reaffirmed in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150 (1973).
238. COHEN-1982, supra note 4.
239. Id. at 385 (citing Jim v. CIT Financial Services, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751
(1975), rev'g 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1974) (Hernandez, J., dissenting); In
re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d. 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz.
192, 571 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1977), discussed supra Part I. A. 2.
240. COHEN-1982, supra note 4, at 385 (citing United States v. Mackey, ex rel.
Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856), discussed supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text).
241. COHEN-1982, supra note 4, at 385 (citing the old Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases discussed supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text).
Cohen-1982 also notes that the inclusion of Indian tribes within § 1738 would require
tribes to give full faith and credit to states and other tribes. COHEN-1982, supra note 4,
at 385 (citing Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977); Reiter v.
Marion Corp., 299 F.2d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
242.
Both reason and authority support the application of these doctrines to conflicts of
laws arising between Indian tribes and other jurisdictions. Choice of law rules
based on the comity principle are a flexible doctrine [sic] the reasons for which
often apply to tribal jurisdictions as well as others, and courts have generally rec-
ognized tribal law in appropriate cases.
COHEN-1982, supra note 4, at 385 (footnote omitted).
The position taken with respect to the analogous extradition statute is similarly ambigu-
ous. Id. at 382-84. The authors acknowledge the Morgan decision, criticize it using
Mackey and Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882), but then flip back to the Morgan con-
clusion because interpretation of the term "territory" in the extradition statute to include
44
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C. Law Review Discussions
In the late 1970's, the conflicting decisions in Jim v. CIT Finan-
cial Services and Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., sparked increased
discussion of the issue. Professor Ragsdale's article243 did not have
the benefit of the Brown decision, but did review the background
of the application of full faith and credit to Indian tribes up
through the Jim decision. The overall conclusion was that there
was no legal theory adequate to compel the extension of section
1738 to Indian tribes244 and that the cases did not support a con-
clusion that Indian tribes were "territories" within the meaning of
section 1738.245 The article goes on to discuss various "policy"
considerations relating to the issue. While it is suggested that such
an inclusion would have the favorable effect of integrating tribal
courts into the "permanent fabric of America ' ' 41 and would insti-
tutionalize the somewhat chaotic relationships between the tribes
and the states, it also notes that problems would result from the
consequent limitations on state subject matter jurisdiction247 and
the lack of an effective method of challenging a tribal court's fail-
ure to grant full faith and credit.248
Two subsequent discussions in Arizona law reviews did have the
benefit of, and were critical of, the Arizona Court of Appeals' de-
cision in Brown. Perhaps as a result, both overstate the strength of
their position.
Indian tribes has "other problems." Id. at 383. The reason stated for that position is that
the 1793 extradition statute (Act of Feb. 12, 1793, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 302) specifically re-
ferred to the then existing "territories northwest and south of the River Ohio" and that
language has been subsequently changed only as part of various codifications and therefore
is less amenable to a broad construction than was the statute involved in Mackey. Co-
HIEN-1982, supra note 4, at 383 & n.26. Though not so contended in the 1982 version of
Cohen's Handbook, the history and language of the 1804 full faith and credit statute sup-
ports only slightly less strongly the same argument with respect to that statute.
243. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M.L. REV. (1977). Professor Ragsdale was acknowledged as a contributor or
consultant to the Report of Task Force Two of the American Indian Policy Review Com-
mission (see discussion supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text) and at least appendix
XIII to that report appears to be a precursor of his New Mexico Law Review article.
244. Ragsdale, supra note 243, at 135.
245. Id. at 141. Among other things, the article notes the lack of mention of Indian
tribes in the legislative history of the 1804 Act (id. at 136) and the fact that neither
Mackey nor the old Eighth Circuit cases discussed the full faith and credit implementing
legislation (id. at 138-39).
246. Id. at 142.
247. Id. at 146-69.
248. Id. at 150-51. The article concludes that: "[T]he only way to challenge a tribe's
refusal to enforce a state court judgment would be through filing a suit in federal court
under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, alleging that the tribe's failure to recognize thejudgment is a violation of due process." Id. at 150 (footnote omitted). Perhaps unfortu-
nately, even that possibility was precluded by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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The earlier of the two 24 9 is very critical of the cases supporting
a "narrow" construction of the term "territory" and champions
the various dicta implying a "broad" construction.15 That Note
does, however, recognize the political aspects involved in the issue.
Perhaps taking a clue from Mackey, that author asserts that the
creation of Indian tribal governments, the Navajo in particular,
were authorized by the federal government and that the 1934 In-
dian Reorganization Act and the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act
"may be properly considered as organic acts."25' thus placing
them on an equal footing with the governments of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands. While that argument is not without logic
and clearly supports the desired conclusion, it ignores and is con-
trary to the fundamental theories supporting tribal self-
government.
The later Arizona article252 is perhaps even more advocatory.
Mackey is declared "powerful authority" for extension of section
1738 to include Indian tribes.2 "5 This article, too, takes the posi-
tion that Indian tribes "exist as products of congressional
legislation. 254
Each of these sources,255 with varying degrees of openness, ad-
mit that the conclusion that Indian tribes are "territories" within
section 1738 is not unequivocally supported by the court decisions
or legislative history selected for discussion. Additionally, at least
the Arizona articles impliedly acknowledge that reaching their de-
sired conclusions requires the prior conclusion that the govern-
mental authority exercised by Indian tribes is a product of con-
gressional action. Even though that may, as a matter of practical
reality, be the case, in legal theory it is akin to throwing out the
proverbial baby with the bath.
249. Note, Arizona Appellate Decisions-Indian Law: The Application of Full
Faith and Credit to Indian Nations, 20 ARIz. L. Rav. 1064 (1978).
250. This stance was extended even to the point of stating that Mackey and the old
Eighth Circuit cases were "approved" by the Supreme Court by its irrelevant footnote in
Martinez.
251. Note, supra note 249, at 1071 n.65. The Note apparently does not recognize as
important the fact that the Navajo Tribe did not accept, and is not organized under, the
1934 Indian Reorganization Act.
252. Comment, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of Full
Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 801.
253. Id. at 820.
254. Id. at 808.
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IV. UNDERLYING POLITICAL CONCEPTS
On the surface, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion is concerned only with proof of other states' records. How-
ever, in function, it is a keystone in the unique vision of the gov-
ernment underlying and pervading that document. The
Constitution's first three articles provide the framework of the na-
tional government. The fourth article, entitled
"States-Reciprocal Relationship Between States and With the
United States", provides the basis for the "federal" character of
the resulting nation. But for provisions such as those found in arti-
cle IV, the United States would have been much less united. The
full faith and credit clause is the first of those federalistic provi-
sions. While retaining the fundamental sovereignty of the states, it
establishes a tie among them-a special recognition of their legal
and political interrelatedness. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and at present, the principles of comity provide an
adequate basis for interjurisdictional recognition of judgments.
The full faith and credit requirements recognize and institutional-
ize a much closer political relationship between the jurisdictions
subject to the Constitution.
There is nothing in congressional history or court decisions
which proves an intent to bring within this federal relationship
any political entities which are not a part of the nation established
by and under the Constitution. The non-state political entities
which are recognized as having been brought within the operation
of the full faith and credit clause by the 1804 Act are constituent
parts of the federal polity. The District of Columbia is expressly
provided for in the Constitution.2 56 The political territories estab-
lished by Congress through organic acts were not so clearly envi-
sioned by the Constitution;251 7 but the legal process of creating ter-
ritories as the first step in creating new states258 was established
by the Confederacy before the drafting of the Constitution and
was continued thereafter by a government operated by persons
who participated in the Constitution's drafting. Persons involved
in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution were still active
in the federal government, as legislators, administrators and ju-
rists, as the territorial governments were being authorized and
when the 1804 Act was adopted.
256. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
257. It is generally accepted that Congress' power to create territorial governments is
within the powers granted in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, but might have been also found
under art. I, § 8, cl. 18, "Enactment of laws for execution of governmental powers".
258. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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That those persons did not understand Indian tribes to be mem-
bers of the federal polity is rather obvious from the Constitution,
as reflected in the provision for not counting Indians in the process
of apportioning the members of the House of Representatives' 9
and the separate listing of "Indian tribes" among the entities with
which Congress had the power to regulate commerce.2 60 That
point of view is also rather obvious from the fact that, for nearly
ninety years after ratification of the Constitution, dealings be-
tween the United States government and Indian tribes were by
treaty rather than by legislation in the manner applicable to mem-
bers of the federal polity. The Trade and Intercourse Acts, the
primary vehicle for congressional regulation of commerce with the
Indians, prohibited travel in the Indian country south of the Ohio
River without a passport issued by state or federal authorities.26 '
If Indian tribes were then considered "territories of the United
States," requiring a passport to travel into Indian lands would be
preposterous.
It is against that backdrop that the application of the full faith
and credit implementing acts must be measured. Were, or are,
Indian tribes so closely interwoven into the federal system to have
become a political part of it? The key Supreme Court decision
which supports a contention that Indian tribes are territories
under section 1738 or its predecessors, United States ex rel.
Mackey v. Coxe,262 is based on the conclusion that the treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation (and possibly
the Indian trade legislation passed by Congress) were sufficient to
bring that tribe within the federal system. The Court stated:
"[The Cherokee territory] is not a foreign, but a domestic terri-
tory,-a territory which originated under our constitution and
laws."263 That language is not consistent with preceding opinions
concerning the relationship between the Indians and the United
States264 and is overshadowed by later decisions.2 5
Those political entities not labeled "territory" which neverthe-
259. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2. This provision was continued in the post Civil War
fourteenth amendment.
260. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
261. See Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 3, 1 Stat. 469, 470; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch.
46, § 3, 1 Stat. 743, 744; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 3, 2 Stat. 139, 141. The 1802
Trade and Intercourse Act was still in effect when the 1804 implementing act was adopted.
262. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
263. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
264. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Both cases involved the same Indian tribe as was
involved in Mackey.
265. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. An-
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less have been found to be included within that term in section
1738 have been, as an integral part of that conclusion, found to be
a part of the United States "system of government. 2 66 Local gov-
ernments, such as those of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam
and American Samoa, were created by act of the federal govern-
ment and carved from a part of the geographic domain of the
United States not already under a government existing under the
Constitution. By act of the federal government, the inhabitants of
those discrete geographic areas were given the authority to govern
themselves, subject to the Constitution and applicable federal
laws.
It can be argued that congressional acts such as the Indian Re-
organization Act26 7 or section six of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilita-
tion Act 268 created the tribal governments just as similar acts cre-
ated the Virgin Islands' and Puerto Rican governments. That
argument is both realistic and not without force.269 It is, however,
inconsistent with the basis on which Indian tribes claim the right
to self-determination. An alternative interpretation of such acts is
that they do not purport to create the authority for Indian self-
government but, instead, merely set forth the conditions under
which the federal government will recognize and deal with repre-
sentatives of the individual Indians.
Indian tribes, at least in current legal theory, are not constitu-
ent parts of the political, sovereign nation of the United States.
The international law theory that was applied to Indians prior to
the birth of the United States, continued by decisions of the Su-
preme Court and acts of Congress and given new meaning in the
current theories of Indian self-determination, is based on the pre-
mise that the Indian tribes' right of selfgovernment antedates and
is independent of the United States. Based on that theory, Indian
tribes cannot be "territories" or "possessions" "of the United
States." The right to self-government, under that theory, is not a
creation of the United States, but of some higher or different
authority.
266. See, e.g., Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 438 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
267. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
268. Act of Apr. 19, 1950, ch. 92, § 6, 64 Stat. 44, 45 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 636
(1982)) (authorizing the Navajo tribe to adopt a constitution).
269. See Note, supra note 249; Comment, supra note 252.
270. The general theory that tribes govern through their inherent authority, not
through authority delegated from the United States, is supported by Supreme Court deci-
sions such as Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), and the opinion of
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior at the time of the adoption of the I.R.A.
Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934).
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A related problem is whether Congress even has the authority
to include Indian tribes within a full faith and credit implement-
ing statute. Article four, section one of the Constitution grants
that authority only as to states. Power to include territories has
been found in article four, section three-which mentions only
"territory" "belonging to the United States."2 7' If that clause can
be construed as granting power over Indian tribes, that interpreta-
tion has not been previously suggested by the courts. Perhaps the
treaty power, which has been used with respect to Indians, could
have been invoked to authorize treaties including full faith and
credit provisions binding on the states through the Supremacy
Clause; but that avenue was foreclosed over one hundred years
ago.272
That leaves, as a basis for congressional authority, only the "In-
dian commerce clause" of article one, section eight, clause three
of the Constitution. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez273 implies
that Congress has the authority under that section to require In-
dian tribes to give full faith and credit to other Indian tribes and
states. Is it, however, sufficient to authorize Congress to require
states to grant full faith and credit to Indian tribes? Given the
breadth of the power allowed to Congress both under the inter-
state commerce clause and with respect to Indians, it is at least
conceivable that Congress could properly amend section 1738 to
include Indian tribes. There is no court decision which, after ex-
ploring congressional power under the Indian commerce clause,
has found that Congress invoked that power in 1804 or 1948 when
enacting or codifying the implementing legislation. However, the
Court has held that Congress has the power to invalidate, through
implied preemption, state legislation governing the jurisdiction of
its own courts.2 74 Requiring the granting of full faith and credit to
tribal court judgments is less intrusive on state autonomy and
271. Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977),
interprets that phrase to exclude lands possessed by Indian tribes. See discussion supra
notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
272. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)):
[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, That
nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation
of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe.
The language of that act implies that, theretofore, Indian tribes were considered "indepen-
dent nations".
273. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
274. Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, -
U.S. -, -, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1986).
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275therefore probably within the scope of Congress' power. While
Congress may have the authority to include Indian tribes within
section 1738, whether that authority should be exercised remains
an open question.
SUMMATION
A conclusion that tribal court judgments are entitled to full
faith and credit under section 1738 may outwardly support the
current theory of Indian self-determination. However, the court or
commentator wishing to reach that result, for that reason, faces a
dilemma. A conclusion that section 1738 includes Indian tribes
must be based on the proposition that they are part of the United
States' federal polity, while Indian self-determination is based on
the proposition that they are not a part of that polity. In addition,
the reciprocity required by section 1738 would tend to limit tribal
flexibility which is an important part of the concept of self-deter-
mination and which may be needed to adequately protect the
tribes' interests or those of its members.
Excluding Indian tribes from the operation of section 1738 does
not mean that tribal court judgments will be unenforceable in
state or federal courts. A number of non-Indian court decisions
have, directly or indirectly, enforced tribal court decisions despite
an unwillingness to find that section 1738 requires that result. Ap-
plication of principles of comity have resulted in numerous
favorable decisions. Employing comity, rather than full faith and
credit, should not be seen as somehow derogatory. Except where
controlled by treaty, judgments of all truly foreign nations are
subject to comity considerations. It would not seem that tribes,
which claim sovereignty antecedent to and independent of that of
the United States, should object to being treated on an equal foot-
ing with European or Asian nations which antedate and are inde-
pendent of the United States.
Perhaps unfortunately, some non-Indian courts applying comity
considerations may decline to enforce judgments of some tribal
courts because of perceived inadequacies in those courts.2 76 Those
inadequacies may be of two types: (1) use of a traditional tribal
remedy not available in an "Anglo" court; or (2) procedural or
qualitative deficiencies. Since state and federal courts may not
have the powers or facilities to enforce the more traditional tribal
275. The full faith and credit provision of the Indian Child Welfare Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982)) has not been held, by any court, to be beyond congressional authority.
276. See, e.g., Note, supra note 255; Brakel, American Indian Tribal Court: Sepa-
rate? "Yes," Equal? "Probably Not", 62 A.B.A. J. 1002 (1976); Collins, Johnson & Per-
kins, American Indian Courts and Tribal Self-Government, 63 A.B.A. J. 808 (1977).
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remedies (which, in any event, may be ineffectual in non-Indian
society), tribal judges and litigants will undoubtedly recognize the
limited effect of such remedies and avoid them in situations which
might require off-reservation enforcement. The perceived proce-
dural and qualitative inadequacies of tribal courts can be over-
come, but only by the tribes themselves and perhaps only with the
surrender of some of the attributes which distinguish tribal courts
from state courts.2
If tribal courts continue to exercise jurisdiction only over those
subject matters over which tribal jurisdiction has been historically
supported, that is, actions between tribal members or concerning
tribal benefits or property rights, the lack of enforceable full faith
and credit for tribal court judgments does not create a significant
problem. It is only when tribes and tribal courts act like non-In-
dian governments and courts and attempt to involuntarily affect
the rights of nonmembers that problems arise.
Thus, as is usual in Indian law matters, the problem comes full
circle-back to the fundamental question of the proper political,
social and ideological relationship between Indian tribes and the
other peoples and governments of the United States. That, of
course, is not a justiciable issue.
It may seem rather obvious that Indian tribes are, or are not,
included within the meaning of "territory" or "possession" in sec-
tion 1738. However, which of those conclusions appears "obvious"
ultimately depends on an initial point of view. If practical reality
is the benchmark, Indian tribes should be considered "territories."
If legal or political theory or ideology plays a significant part in
the consideration, Indian tribes should not be considered
"territories."
Indian tribes exist as viable entities at the sufferance of Con-
gress. Tribes have been terminated and reestablished by Congress.
In that sense, they are akin to territories. The continued political
existence of both depend on the will of Congress. Acts of Con-
gress, such as the Indian Reorganization Act and administrative
regulations, have an enormous impact on the characteristics of tri-
bal governments and the manner in which their authority is exer-
cised. That situation may change as tribal governments increase
their revenues through local taxation or economic enterprises.17 8
277. These factors include having less formal court proceedings available, like the
Navajo "Peacemaker Courts," which allow the court to act more as a community arbitra-
tor than as a formal, distant, adjudicator and making available tribal, communal remedies.
These features also encompass such less favorable attributes as direct, or indirect, political
and social control of the tribal court judges and use of judicial positions as "spoils" in
tribal politics.
278. Even those activities are subject to significant control by federal authorities.
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Their reliance on federal funding, with the concommitant subju-
gation to federal regulation, may decrease to a level no greater
than that of "Anglo" local governments. Until that point is
reached, the practical independence of tribal government is sub-
ject to serious question.
In addition, both Indian tribes and individuals exist and act
within the economy of the United States. Depending on one's
point of view, Indians may or may not be seen as being integrated
into American society. However, regardless of that point of view,
Indian society in the 1980's is more like the general American
society than like the Indian societies existing before 1500 or even,
in large part, a mere hundred years ago. 9
Some of the previously logical reasons against concluding that
Indian tribes are territories are no longer valid. Morgan noted
that Indians were not citizens-not part of the United States' po-
litical family.280 In 1924, the bar to United States citizenship was
removed281 and, more recently, Indians have become citizens of
the states in which they reside.
The notion that the land occupied by the Indians was not
"owned" by the United States, mentioned in Brown, while not
ever accurate in pure legal theory, is no longer accurate even from
a practical standpoint. From the time Europeans began immigrat-
ing to what was to become the United States until the 1870's,
Indians militarily and physically controlled an ever-decreasing
portion of that geographic territory. From a practical point of
view, the United States "conquered" the last portions held by In-
dians over one hunderd years ago. Indian tribes are now in the
process of regaining control of those areas allocated to them by
the treaties.
While each tribe may be proceeding along its own path with
varying degrees of success, tribal governments are taking on more
and more of the appearance and function of non-Indian local gov-
ernments-again in practical terms, coming to look and act like
part of the American legal and political system. Indian tribes are,
in practical legal and political respects, much like "territories"
such as Puerto Rico. They can, within broad limitations, choose
their own forms of government, political leaders and government
See, e.g,, Ranah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 839-45 (1982);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-49 (1980).
279. Cf. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the As-
similation Era, 40 ARK. L. REv. 327 (1987).
280. Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883). See also Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 94 (1884).
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officials in the manner they decide is best. In addition, they are in
most practical respects subject to, and have the benefit of, the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution and are subject to the ple-
nary powers of Congress.
In fact, there appears to be only one factor which opposes a
conclusion that Indian tribes are "territories" for purposes of the
full faith and credit implementing statutes: the political distinction
between the Indian and the remainder of the United States polity.
That factor is also the theoretical basis for "Indian law." From a
legal theory or ideological point of view, it is this single factor
which counsels strongly against, and indeed prevents, a conclusion
that Indian tribes are "territories" within section 1738.
In the final analysis, and regardless of the initial point of view,
the Indian "right" of self-determination, whatever that might in-
clude, may simply be a matter of ideology and legal theory. It is
ideology, however, which has provided the foundation for "Indian
law." That foundation has, in turn, allowed Indians to retain at
least some part of their cultural and political identity in the face
of the overwhelming number and power of the non-Indians who
"settled" the areas the Indians' ancestors once possessed
unchallenged.
A determination, why or however made, that Indian tribes are
"territories" for section 1738 purposes may be a slight chink in
that theoretical foundation-but then, too, Achilles had only one
small point of vulnerability. Whether it is "right" or "appropri-
ate" for Indians to retain their separate political-legal status is
beyond both this discussion and the proper scope of "the law." It
should not, however, be inadvertently surrendered, or even weak-
ened, for the expediency of strengthening the possibility of ob-
taining the assistance of non-Indian courts in enforcing tribal laws
and tribal court judgments against nonmembers.
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